On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 3, 3:56 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:

On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 6:08 AM, Craig Weinberg<whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

From blindsight, synesthesia, and anosognosia we know that particular qualia are not inevitably associated with the conditions they usually
represent for us, so it seems impossible to justify qualia on a
functionalist basis. Just as a computer needs no speakers and video
screen inside itself, there is no purpose for such a presentation
layer within our own mechanism. Of course, even if there were a
purpose, there is no hint of such a possibility from mechanism alone. If there was some reason that a bucket of rocks could benefit by some
kind of collective 'experience' occurring amongst them, that's a
million miles from suspecting that experience could be a conceivable

Rather than 'consciousness', human beings would benefit evolutionarily much more by just being able to do something mechanically conceivable things like teleport, time travel, or breathe fire. Awareness doesn't
even make sense as a possibility. Were we not experiencing it
ourselves we could never anticipate any such possibility in any

Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?

The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray,
is late-error detection.

Why would a device need to be conscious in order to have late-error

I agree. People confuse consciousness-the-qualia, and consciousness- the-integrating function. Stathis was talking about the qualia. Evolution can press only on the function, a priori.

As far as ballcocks and electronic sensors, the difference is that
they don't assemble themselves. We use their native capacities for
purposes that plastic and metal has no way of accessing. The ballcock
is only a thing in our world, it doesn't have any world of its own. I
think that the molecules that make up the materials have their own
world, but it's not likely to be anything like what we could imagine.
Maybe all molecules have a collective experience on that microcosmic
level, where snapshots of momentary awareness corresponding to change
string together centuries of relative inactivity.

It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that is
in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.

This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself which can be explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine "feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks at first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person view. If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine. As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the meta- level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.



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