On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that is
> > in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
> > cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
> This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
> well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself
I don't see that there can be any interior realism without qualia -
they are the same thing. Mechanism assumes that because we can't
explain the existence of qualia mechanistically, it must be an
emergent property/illusion of mechanism. If we instead see that
mechanism is a particular kind of lowest common denominator exterior
qualia, then it would be silly to try to explain the parent
phenomenology in terms of the child set of reduced possibilities.
> which can be
> explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
> "feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks at
> first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
> from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person view.
> If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
> As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
> mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the meta-
> level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
> consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
Mechanism is always going to implicate mechanism as the cause of
anything, because it has no capacity to describe anything else and it
has not capacity to extend beyond descriptions. Consciousness is a
much larger phenomenon, as it includes all of mechanism as well as
many more flavors of experience. Only through direct experience can we
know that it is possible that there is a difference between
description and reality.
Through the monochrome lens of mechanism, it is easy to prove that
audiences will think they see something other than black and white
pixels because we understand that they are seeing fluid patterns of
changing pixels rather than the pixels themselves, but this doesn't
explain how we see color. The idea that a machine would logically not
think of itself as a machine doesn't explain the existence of what it
feels like to be the opposite of a machine or how it could really feel
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at