On 04 Apr 2012, at 19:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 4, 3:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 03 Apr 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It is not the fact that matter detects and responds to itself that
is
in question, it is the presentation of an interior realism which
cannot be explained in a mechanistic context.
This is begging the question. And I would say that mechanism explains
well the interior realism, up to the qualia itself
I don't see that there can be any interior realism without qualia -
they are the same thing.
I agree with this.
Mechanism assumes that because we can't
explain the existence of qualia mechanistically, it must be an
emergent property/illusion of mechanism.
It explains the existence of qualia, including some possible geometry
of them. It fails to explain only some aspect of qualia, but it meta-
explains why it cannot explain those aspects. The internal realism has
a necessary blind spot somehow.
If we instead see that
mechanism is a particular kind of lowest common denominator exterior
qualia,
then it would be silly to try to explain the parent
phenomenology in terms of the child set of reduced possibilities.
?
which can be
explained only in the negative. It is that thing that the machine
"feels correctly" to be non functional and makes the machine thinks
at
first "non correctly" that she is not a machine. It is not correct
from the 3-view, but still correct from the machine first person
view.
If 3-I is a machine, the 1-I cannot feels to be a machine.
As Minski pointed out, machines will be as befuddled as us about the
mind-body problem. But comp can explains this "befuddling" at the
meta-
level, completely. The machines too. In a sense, the first person and
consciousness is not a machine, with the mechanist hypothesis.
Mechanism is always going to implicate mechanism as the cause of
anything, because it has no capacity to describe anything else and it
has not capacity to extend beyond descriptions.
Yes it has. Once a machine is Löbian it can see its limitations, and
overcome it. This leads to many paths.
Consciousness is a
much larger phenomenon, as it includes all of mechanism as well as
many more flavors of experience.
It is fuzzy. I can agree and disagree depending how you circumscribe
the meaning of the terms you are using.
Only through direct experience can we
know that it is possible that there is a difference between
description and reality.
Yes. But we cannot know reality as such, except for the conscious non
communicable parts. So, when we talk with each other, we can only make
hypothesis and reasoning.
Through the monochrome lens of mechanism, it is easy to prove that
audiences will think they see something other than black and white
pixels because we understand that they are seeing fluid patterns of
changing pixels rather than the pixels themselves, but this doesn't
explain how we see color. The idea that a machine would logically not
think of itself as a machine doesn't explain the existence of what it
feels like to be the opposite of a machine or how it could really feel
like anything.
But mechanism is not proposed as an explanation. It is more a "law"
that we exploit to clarify the problems. You can see it as a strong
assumption/belief given that it is a belief in possible
reincarnations. Comp is refutable. Non-comp is not refutable.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
