Hi: Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation. The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of diagonalization by Gödel makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the Gödel theorem). Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> > Hi Craig Weinberg > > I agree. > > Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: > > Cs = subject + object > > The subject is always first person indeterminate. > Being indeterminate, it is not computable. > > QED > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> > *Receiver:* everything-list <email@example.com> > *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 > *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary > > This sentence does not speak English. > > These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. > > s l u ,u s > > > If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate > that form is not inherently informative. > > The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as > ascertaining the origin of awareness. > > Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless > epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation > can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular > category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. > > Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what > Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp > contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively > assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G > del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of > course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be > complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect > that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, > but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that > this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining > consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a > priori and independently of any arithmetic logic. > > Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of > awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or > that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary > indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place > and *why* is has not been addressed at all. > > As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to > demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative > assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another > thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure > up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not > follow from quanta. > > Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of > sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining > shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would > necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between > channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial > frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the > entropy of the totality. > > Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from > either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, > for direct participation? > > Craig > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/OP7M4cmbaCIJ. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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