Roger,
I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a
inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the
consequences of this inner computation.

  like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that
this IS  the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind
and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when,
in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>

>  Hi Alberto G. Corona
>
> What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
> way to hook it to my brain.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/29/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>
>   Hi:
>
> Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially)
> computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things
> depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This
> is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".
>
>  The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any
> turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the
> brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage
> concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the
> result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.
>
> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our
> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs.
> We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed
> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to
> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware
> of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the
> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means
> of an adquired metacomputation.
>
> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman
> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition.
> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of
> diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same
> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive
> mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
>
>
> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free
> will nor in any other existential question.
>
> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
>
>>  Hi Craig Weinberg
>>  I agree.
>>  Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>>  Cs = subject + object
>>  The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
>>  QED
>>   Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/29/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>>
>>   This sentence does not speak English.
>>
>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
>>
>> s l u ,u s
>>
>>
>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate
>> that form is not inherently informative.
>>
>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
>> ascertaining the origin of awareness.
>>
>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation
>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular
>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>>
>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what
>> Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp
>> contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively
>> assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G
>> del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of
>> course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be
>> complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect
>> that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this,
>> but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that
>> this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining
>> consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a
>> priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
>>
>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or
>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary
>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place
>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>>
>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative
>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another
>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure
>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not
>> follow from quanta.
>>
>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of
>> sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining
>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would
>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between
>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial
>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the
>> entropy of the totality.
>>
>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from
>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences,
>> for direct participation?
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
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