Roger, I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > What sort of an output would the computer give me ? > It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no > way to hook it to my brain. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 > *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > Hi: > > Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) > computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things > depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This > is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters". > > The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any > turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that the > brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can manage > concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the > result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. > > For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our > intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. > We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed > as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to > mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware > of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the > observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means > of an adquired metacomputation. > > The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman > for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. > In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of > diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same > conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive > mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). > > > Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free > will nor in any other existential question. > > 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > >> Hi Craig Weinberg >> I agree. >> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >> Cs = subject + object >> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >> QED >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> This sentence does not speak English. >> >> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >> >> s l u ,u s >> >> >> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate >> that form is not inherently informative. >> >> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >> >> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >> >> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what >> Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp >> contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively >> assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G >> del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of >> course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be >> complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect >> that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, >> but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that >> this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining >> consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a >> priori and independently of any arithmetic logic. >> >> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of >> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or >> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary >> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place >> and *why* is has not been addressed at all. >> >> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to >> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative >> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another >> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure >> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not >> follow from quanta. >> >> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of >> sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining >> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would >> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between >> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial >> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the >> entropy of the totality. >> >> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from >> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, >> for direct participation? >> >> Craig >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/OP7M4cmbaCIJ. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
