Hi Alberto,

Yes, all good points. We don't have access to our non-metacomputational 
layers, but that still doesn't mean that computation implies any sort of 
awareness. A string of dominoes falling is a computation but there need not 
be an experience there if all there was to the event was the 
geometric-gravitational sequence of object relation playing out that we 
experience as observers.

Whether awareness is truly non-computational or just inaccessible to our 
computation makes no difference as far as the point I am making. Neither 
descriptor implies experience. They are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
explain consciousness. Just because we have a physiological description 
within our own collective human experience doesn't mean that we should be 
able to reverse engineer awareness itself from that description alone. 
Doing so may be a catastrophic distortion.

Craig

On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:21:49 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Hi:
>
> Awareness can  be functionally (we do not know if experientially) 
>  computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do 
> things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time 
> status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called 
> "interpreters".
>
>  The lack of  understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that 
> any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why  it is said that 
> the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do.  We humans can 
> manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second 
> is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.
>
> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our 
> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. 
> We can not know  our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed 
> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired"  to 
> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware 
> of it.  Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the 
> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means 
> of an adquired metacomputation.
>
> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman 
> for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. 
> In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process  of 
> diagonalization by Gödel  makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same 
> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive 
> mathematical program. (see my post about the Gödel theorem).
>
> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free 
> will nor in any other existential question.
>
> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>
>
>>  Hi Craig Weinberg 
>>  
>> I agree.
>>  
>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>>  
>> Cs = subject + object
>>  
>> The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
>>  
>> QED
>>  
>>  
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <javascript:>
>> 8/29/2012 
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so 
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:> 
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>>
>>   This sentence does not speak English.
>>
>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
>>
>> s l u ,u s 
>>
>>
>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate 
>> that form is not inherently informative.
>>
>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as 
>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. 
>>
>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless 
>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation 
>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular 
>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>>
>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what 
>> Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp 
>> contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively 
>> assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G 
>> del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of 
>> course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be 
>> complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect 
>> that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, 
>> but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that 
>> this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining 
>> consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a 
>> priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
>>
>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of 
>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or 
>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary 
>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place 
>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>>
>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to 
>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative 
>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another 
>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure 
>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not 
>> follow from quanta.
>>
>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of 
>> sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining 
>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would 
>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between 
>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial 
>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the 
>> entropy of the totality.
>>
>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from 
>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, 
>> for direct participation?
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
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