On 9/21/2012 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:


    It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations
    are already there.  The problem is learning their results.


The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?

Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.

Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.

Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.

Bruno

Dear Bruno,

OK, but you are ignoring my question: How does the existence become decomposed such that there are "epistemological beings"? So far your explanation is focused on the representation in terms of arithmetics and I accept your reasonings: In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done." There is no "action", no change, all that exists "just is". But then what do we make of time? We can dismiss it as an illusion? But that would be just an evasion of the obvious question: Why does the illusion occur? I am interested in explanation that at least try to answer this question: How does the illusion persist? What might "cause" it? Why do "special purpose" computations occur such that we can identify physical systems with them? My proposal is to weaken the concept of Computational Universality a tiny bit and thus allow room for the possibility of an answer to the questions that I have. Consider this: What happens is there does *not* exist any physical system that can implement a particular computation X? Is it possible for us, humans, or any other sentient physical being to "know" anything about X, such that we might have some model of X that is faithfully representative?


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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