On 21 Sep 2012, at 16:24, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/21/2012 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:

It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?

Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.

Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.

Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.


Dear Bruno,

OK, but you are ignoring my question: How does the existence become decomposed such that there are "epistemological beings"?

We agree that arithmetical truth is independent of us, or more formalistically we assume 0 s(0) ... and the law of addition and multiplication.

From that, and only that, we proves the existence of the computations, and get notably all the "dreams", as with comp we know that dreams, subjective experiences, needs to be associated to those computations. The epistemological beings appears in the content of those dreams, and recover, or not, sharable persistent epistemological realities.

So far your explanation is focused on the representation in terms of arithmetics and I accept your reasonings: In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done." There is no "action", no change, all that exists "just is". But then what do we make of time?

Time is easy, with comp, as we give an importance to processing, or successive manipulation. There is a variety of time since the start:
the order 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...
The UD time steps,
The particular steps of each computations in the UD,
None give the physical time, as it needs to be extracted from the physics emerging on the dreams.

We can dismiss it as an illusion?

We better not. Immaterial does not mean illusion, unless you are fictionalist, in which case comp is meaningless.

But that would be just an evasion of the obvious question: Why does the illusion occur?

Comp explains this entirely. Numbers can already explains where the illusion comes from, and why the illusion has many incommunicable features. This *is* solved.

I am interested in explanation that at least try to answer this question: How does the illusion persist?

That is the difficult things. That is what I translated in arithmetic. That is the measure problem. Either comp gives a quantum machinery below our substitution level, or it fails. The material hypostases already show that the measure one obeys to quantum like logics, and we got an arithmetical quantization in which we can test if there are quantum gate at the "universal dream bottom".

What might "cause" it? Why do "special purpose" computations occur such that we can identify physical systems with them? My proposal is to weaken the concept of Computational Universality a tiny bit and thus allow room for the possibility of an answer to the questions that I have.

CT makes the concept of Turing universality is one of the most solid epistemological concept ever ... (cf CT)
Good luck.

Consider this: What happens is there does not exist any physical system that can implement a particular computation X?

All computations can be implemented in any Turing universal system. *Many* subparts of the known physics are Turing universal, so what you say is impossible.

Is it possible for us, humans, or any other sentient physical being to "know" anything about X, such that we might have some model of X that is faithfully representative?

We already know many things which are not computable. Recursion theory is mainly the study and classification of those non computable things. In math, the computable is both pro-eminent in the construction we do, and the non computable is majority in the ontology. For example the non computable functions from N to N are not enumerable, and the computable one are enumerable (even if not mechanically or computably enumerable (see my posts in FOAR).

But again, this has nothing to do with the notion of physical implementations, which is just an implementation (in the mathematical sense) in a universal system that can be run physically (keeping in mind that "physically" has a new meaning or representation in the comp theory).



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