On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:47:26 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 3:02:05 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Sep 2012, at 18:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, September 24, 2012 5:13:11 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Sep 2012, at 20:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Sunday, September 23, 2012 11:28:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> On 23 Sep 2012, at 15:05, Roger Clough wrote:
> > Hi Evgenii Rudnyi
> > Phenomena are the how physical processes appear to our senses.
> > So they are appearances, not the processes themselves.
> > But scientific experiments and measurements are not
> > made on the appearances, they are made on the
> > processes. Thus the appearences areor [phenomena
> > are said to be "well-grounded" in the processes themselves.
> > Kant spelled this out in great detail, calling "noumena" the
> > actual physical process which we cannot reach by our senses,
> And which does not exist, at least not in the sense that they
> our senses.
> This is the most counter-intuitive aspect of comp, as the physical
> process are projection on the conditions making the dream
> Why does comp want coherent dreams?
Coherent dreams are reasonable data.
Why does comp want reasonable data?
Comp does not want them. We have them. They are what *we* want to
explain. Comp is just the working hypothesis.
It's circular though. Why do we have them?
To be short, because we accept the arithmetical truth.
What is it that is doing the accepting, and what would arithmetical
truth be without it?
"We" are doing the accepting. And with comp, "we" are supported by the
computations "living" in arithmetical truth.
Arithmetical truth without it cannot exists, like it cannot exist with
the number 666 being absent.
Comp + arithmetical truth implies our existence, and our relative
measure (physical laws).
Comp is your working hypothesis, not mine :)
This make coherent your belief in matter. But you are back at the
start of the mind body problem, as you assume everything we want to
explain (mind, body, and their relation).
I don't believe in matter so much as I believe in material
appearances as a way to make sense of the impersonal. I assume that
sense is the capacity to experience and to meta-juxtapose
experiences within each other. Out of this you get sub-personal
(materialist), super-personal (idealist), and impersonal
(functionalist) projections through which we can think that we could
explain the absence of personal irreducibility.
If instead, we turn this inside out, and see personal level
phenomenology as the primordial principle, then the other
projections make perfect sense as organizational representations.
The authentic presentation is local and proprietary, not disembodied
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