On Monday, October 15, 2012 1:02:05 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > > > On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg > <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> >>> You don't know diddly squat about "our consciousness", you only know >>> about your consciousness; assuming of course that you are conscious, if not >>> then you don't even know that. >>> >> >> If that were true, then you don't know diddly squat about what I know. >> > > Not true, I know you don't have a proof of the Goldbach Conjecture. Well > OK, I don't know that with absolute certainty, maybe you have a proof but > are keeping it secret for some strange reason, but my knowledge is more > than diddly squat because I very strongly suspect you have no such proof > and I'm probably right. But I do know for certain that you don't have a > valid proof that 2+2=5 or a way to directly detect consciousness in any > mind other than your own. >
Then you are claiming to know about "our consciousness" instead of just your own. If you can do that, why can't I? The difference is that I don't put some artificial constraint on what you can or can't know. I let consciousness be what it actually is, rather than what it needs to be to fit into my inherited worldview. > > You can't have it both ways. Either it is possible that we know things or >> it is not. >> > > That is most certainly true, it is possible to know things, it's just not > possible to know all things. > > > You can't claim to be omniscient about my ignorance. >> > > It's almost as if you're claiming your ignorance is vast, well I admit I > am not omniscient about your ignorance, no doubt you are ignorant about > things that I don't know you are ignorant of. > Whatever you can know about what I know, I can also know about what you know. > > > Let's see how computer fares under a giant junkyard magnet. >> > > Let's see how you fare in a junkyard car crusher. > translation - "I concede, I have no argument." Craig > > John K Clark > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/0xKeCfAsPYIJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
