On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

    Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense
    as to
    how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
    contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
    (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
    different levels of same thing".


I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.

Hi Craig,

I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies".



    Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not
    seem to
    be what we refer to as COMP.


COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.

    I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.

Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.

I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an "externalization" of sense. We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while pointing outside of 1p. It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood to be problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or the terms we use and cannot be.

COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.

Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone "do the work" that they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles heel.

--
Onward!

Stephen

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