2012/10/17 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 10/16/2012 10:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>
>>  On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>>
>>> Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
>>> how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
>>> contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena
>>> (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
>>> different levels of same thing".
>>>
>>
>> I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms,
>> molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
>>
>>
>> Hi Craig,
>>
>>     I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and
>> one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and
>> discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and
>> deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs,
>> and bodies".
>>
>
> I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can
> say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a
> qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is
> because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper
> structure is a distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view,
> which tries to reconcile all views of all other views rather than the
> significant themes that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To
> do big picture, I think it has to be broad strokes.
>
>
>  Hi Craig,
>
>     But we sacrifice detail that matters for those broad strokes...
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
>>> be what we refer to as COMP.
>>>
>>
>> COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.
>>
>>
>>     I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.
>>
>
> What seems true about COMP?
>
>
>     The argument as Bruno presents it.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>  Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.
>>
>>
>>     I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an
>> "externalization" of sense.
>>
>
> I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant.
>
>
>     Good!
>
>
>
>
>
>> We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while pointing
>> outside of 1p.
>>
>
> There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p.
>
>
>     I agree, but consider what happens in the limit of the totality.
> Distinguishability itself vanishes and with it 1p. The totality of what
> exists, the necessarily possible, does not have a single consistent 1p, it
> has all possible 1p's simultaneously.
>
>
>
>
>>  It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood to be
>> problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss
>> sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or
>> the terms we use and cannot be.
>>
>
> I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and
> translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we
> say can remind us of what we experience first hand.
>
>
>
>     OK, but we can tease detail from this!
>
>
>
>>  COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
>>
>>
>>     Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical
>> truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone "do the work" that
>> they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the
>> inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles
>> heel.
>>
>
> Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism
> supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics?
>
>
> Life may support mathematics. Life is a computation devoted to making
guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible
in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the
phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a
mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the
computations in which we live.

So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical
ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.

>      Mathematics is just a collection of  representations that are
> internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe
> is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is
> a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen.
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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-- 
Alberto.

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