2012/10/17 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > On 10/16/2012 10:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to >>> how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to >>> contradict that claim: I.G., "These experiential phenomena >>> (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are >>> different levels of same thing". >>> >> >> I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, >> molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing. >> >> >> Hi Craig, >> >> I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and >> one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and >> discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and >> deeper indexing structure to relate the "atoms, molecules, cells, organs, >> and bodies". >> > > I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can > say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a > qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is > because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper > structure is a distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, > which tries to reconcile all views of all other views rather than the > significant themes that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To > do big picture, I think it has to be broad strokes. > > > Hi Craig, > > But we sacrifice detail that matters for those broad strokes... > > > > >> >> >>> >>> Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to >>> be what we refer to as COMP. >>> >> >> COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false. >> >> >> I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way. >> > > What seems true about COMP? > > > The argument as Bruno presents it. > > > > >> >> Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause. >> >> >> I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an >> "externalization" of sense. >> > > I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant. > > > Good! > > > > > >> We cannot say that "sense is this" or "sense is not that" while pointing >> outside of 1p. >> > > There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p. > > > I agree, but consider what happens in the limit of the totality. > Distinguishability itself vanishes and with it 1p. The totality of what > exists, the necessarily possible, does not have a single consistent 1p, it > has all possible 1p's simultaneously. > > > > >> It is the assumption that "sense is ___" that must be understood to be >> problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss >> sense in "as if" terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or >> the terms we use and cannot be. >> > > I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and > translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we > say can remind us of what we experience first hand. > > > > OK, but we can tease detail from this! > > > >> COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation. >> >> >> Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical >> truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone "do the work" that >> they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the >> inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles >> heel. >> > > Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism > supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics? > > > Life may support mathematics. Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.

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So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers. > Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are > internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe > is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is > a mathematical model, its "support" outside of math remains to be seen. > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.