On 17 Oct 2012, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Life may support mathematics.
Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.
Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in
order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where
natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws
have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical-
phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the
computations in which we live.
So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some)
mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that
is, observers.
OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must
do in a first person measure winning way on all computations going
through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of
evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.
I don´t think so .The difference between computation as an ordinary
process of matter
You postulate matter. All what I say, is that if comp is true (I am
Turing emulable), then matter *has to be* recovered as emerging from a
sum on an infinity of computations. Theoretical computer science put
an infinity of restrictions of what that can be.
from the idea of computation as the ultimate essence of reality is
that the first restrict not only the mathematical laws, but also
forces a matemacity of reality because computation in living
beings becomes a process with a cost that favour a low kolmogorov
complexity for the reality. In essence, it forces a discoverable
local universe... ,
In contrast, the idea of computation as the ultimate nature of
realtity postulates computations devoid of restrictions by
definition,
Without restriction?
so they may not restrict anything in the reality that we perceive.
we may be boltzmann brains, we may be a product not of evolution
but a product of random computations. we may perceive elephants
flying...
In a manner which can be evaluate, so we can test the hypothesis. But
computer science and self-referentially correctness (with respect to
those random gaussian, yet computational histories) but, by the first
person indeterminacy argument, a very severe restriction of what the
physical laws can be.
Furthermore, theoretical computer science/mathematical logic explains
the quanta/qualia separation.
The arithmetical, or combinatorial reality is very rich and non trivial.
The point is that comp explains the origin of matter, in a way that we
can test.
Bruno
Mathematics is just a collection of representations that are
internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical
universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what
is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its "support" outside of
math remains to be seen.
Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person
subject. But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to
bet about something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the
ontology, as the "inside view" will already explode in a non
mathematically unboundable way.
You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to
choose numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life
pattern, as they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/
realities.
The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the
computed beings are confronted to both the computable and the non
computable, and a complete transfinite ladder of surprises.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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