On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 11:14:01 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>> On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>> > On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg<whats...@gmail.com>
>> >> >Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If
>> you could
>> >> >have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.
>> >> >Craig
>> >> >
>> > Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is
>> > and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already
>> > have. But I missed it.
>> > Richard
>> Hi Richard,
>> Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly
>> what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard
>> Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense
>> is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no
>> 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett
>> and the materialist, try to deny its existence.
> Right! At the same time, I would say that there is no truly 3p aspect of
> This is equivalent with saying "I will not do science", and coherent with
> your idea that 2+2=5.
I think that this is doing science. I don't think that 2+2=5, I think that
numbers divorced from concrete referents are not real. I don't believe in
the universality of computation, but I do believe that where computation
applies (rigid objects subject to control by recursive enumeration) that
important pseudo 3p views of sense can be modeled. 1p can experience. 3p
cannot. All 3p is experienced as a 1p reflection.
> You might be doing poetry, or continental philosophy, but we can hardly
> appreciate it as such, as you present it as telling a truth, and worst, a
> truth possibly insulting or degrading for an infinity of possible creatures.
Haha. Any infinity of possible creatures who are insulted are cordially
invited to auto-sodomize.
> Even a philosopher can only defend the *possibility* of a truth.
I don't see the point of constantly inserting disclaimers in my words. What
difference would it make? If I say 'I know this is the truth', does that
relieve anyone of their duty to contemplate what I have said for
themselves? You say all kinds of things as if they were true all of the
time. Sometimes you take care to be polite and say that you don't have an
opinion about COMP, or that such and such is true 'in the theory', but to
me it makes no difference. I am perfectly capable of assessing whether what
someone is saying is something that I should accept as fact without a
second thought. I expect that treating others as less than that could be
considered condescending. In the end it's all personal style and I don't
see that it is helpful to spend time on. I could be wrong, but my point is
always going to be 'assuming I'm right'. This is about exchanging ideas,
no? Why formalize it any more than we need to?
> The 3p arises as an internalization of many 1p (private qualitative)
> experiences within another 1p experience (as quantitative public token
> This might be true, but does not makes invalid the existence of theories,
> and objective 3p hypotheses, (like Arithmetic or String theory, or comp in
> cognitive sciences, etc.).
The can be valid theories in a theoretical universe, but I don't see how
they can be valid for this universe in which we actually live. I could be
wrong of course, but someone would need to explain to me why.
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