On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 3:56:26 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>  On 10/17/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:11:00 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>> > It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem   
>> > that is its Achilles heel. 
>> No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it   
>> constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level   
>> measurable. 
>> You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the laws of   
>> physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/ 
>> matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are   
>> hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,   
>> are already given and tested. 
>> That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo. 
>> The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation   
>> shown incompatible with comp. 
>> Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can   
>> formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to   
>> study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to develop   
>> an authentic non-comp theory. 
>> Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the   
>> body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is   
>> just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level. 
> This is exactly why Comp is misguided, as awareness is by definition not 
> emulable in any way.
> Hi Craig,
>     I think that you and Bruno are using different dictionaries of words 
> and are tangled in a web of semantic miscommunication. The 1p demands that 
> it is possible for a conscious entity to have an emulation of its content 
> of awareness if that 1p content is anything more than just a momentary 
> singular coincidence of BP &P - like a Boltzmann brain... What you might 
> not understand is that Bruno is using the Kleene (of Church-Curry) relation 
> between equivalent computations to "collapse into each other" all of the 
> emulations of the same experiential content of the entity.

I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't make 
something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing something. Once 
you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present and meta-represent 
all kinds of awareness within itself. 

> In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an a 
> priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. emulation 
> requires the existence of something to emulate which is itself ultimately 
> traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.
> Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original, 
> beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through which no 
> trace of an original can be accessed. 
>     Nice idea! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation But 
> the concept of a self-erasing copy (a copy without an original) is just a 
> restatement of the 
> Kleene<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_recursion_theorem>
> /Church-Curry<http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/%7Erobin/FMCS/FMCS_04/material/seldin.pdf>relation
>  of the application of computable functions to their own 
> descriptions! This idea is interesting to me because this sorta backs up 
> Bruno's claims about quantum aspects implied by comp!

I wouldn't say that a simulacra is a self-erasing copy, rather it is 
something that doesn't even pretend to be authentic, like blue popsicles. 
There isn't even a framework to pose the question of authenticity. Is it 
'really' blue flavored?

> This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is 
> ultimately inside out.
>     So? Why are you kicking against the pricks? All you need to show is 
> that your concept of Sense is just the involution of Bruno's object of bets 
> and thus bridge the gap between your ideas that are mutually exclusive at 
> this point.

It's an involution, but so is materialism. The reason why Sense has to come 
first is that neither substance nor function has any plausible path to 
generate sense if it doesn't need it to begin with. When we turn it around, 
we can easily see how function and substance are desirable ways of 
elaborating sense. Bruno is quite enthusiastic about showing how substance 
can be expected from an arithmetic primitive, but he is evasive when it 
comes to putting arithmetic itself under the exact same scrutiny regarding 
a sensorimotor-experiential primitive. It's true, we can build mathematical 
puppets which remind us of minds, of cells, windmills, whatever, but they 
don't do anything. They are inert and empty. 

Instead of revealing essence and vitality, this approach yields shadow and 
insignificance. It is seductive because you have to use your actual human 
sense capacities to appreciate this. The shadow model has no capacity to 
reveal the limitations of it's own thesis - and this is what Godel showed. 
If you can look at some whirling, glowing CGI graphic and say, 'yes, this 
is the beginning of love and death, of genius and heroism', then there is 
nothing that can be done for you. Nothing can likely be said to awaken you 
from this trance which elevates cartoon realism above a living, breathing 
body in a concretely real universe. To bridge the gap all that is necessary 
is to look at a menu and to realize that it is not a meal. That arithmetic 
models are relatively insignificant parts of the universe which helps sense 
get from here to there and back.

>  You can't claim to be revealing the primacy of unreality while insisting 
> on the same time of the reality of that revelation. In Comp, Comp itself is 
> just another Bp, and the significance of whether it is Bp or Bp + p is 
> really an obscure footnote.
>     Wow, reflexivity! Nice, but your going too far, Craig. Your argument 
> does not demolish Bruno's comp, it just shows that it is "different" from 
> yours.

It's different but it's different in that if taken to its logical 
conclusion invalidates itself. By taking sense as primordial, my approach 
allows sense to shine through eventually, exposing all isolated solipsisms 
to their own undoing eventually. Nothing that isn't ultimately sourced back 
to the root is viable forever. No simulation is good enough. No paradigm of 
simulation is good enough. The cracks created by the expanding universe 
become chasms, and the high technology of tomorrow becomes the obsolete 
trash of yesterday.


> -- 
> Onward!
> Stephen

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