On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8,
If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think
Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.
Indeed I still have problems with step 8, and want to get back to
that. But I want to do it when it when you're not exhausted arguming
Ah well, that's nice.
Part of the problem, is that I already agree with the
reversal at step 7, so in some sense step 8 is redundant for me.
That is interesting. You are not alone. I have made attempt to make
that precise, and it leads to some use of stronger form of Occam
How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes
(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that
this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness, has
to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it
maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis).
I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer
science can make us feeling that this is really an had move, almost
inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible
explanation and origin in dreams interferences.
But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to
the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the
quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body.
The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a
move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor 1-
person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the computation.
They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor, and so it would
contradict the "yes doctor" assumption.
There may be an issue with the interpretation of the 323
have no problems with the removal of a register that is never
physically used in the calculation of a consious computation.
nuances arise when we consider Everett's many-minds picture.
Do you mean the Albert-Loewer many-mind theory? I guess you mean it
in a more general sense.
counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my
differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated
minds are essential to my consciousness,
What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction
would made this senseful?
I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of
the consciousness of the one in Moscow?
It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In
that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state, do
some different task, get some result, and then operate a Fourier
rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some
consciousness relevant information.
The brain is a quantum object. It doesn't do quantum computations
in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as
different conscious classical propositions. But it does quantum
computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as
an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with
the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience
Not the experience, or it just means the level has not been chosen
of being in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is
constructed to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of
an experience of being in Moscow.
Only if the level is not right. If not you can't say "yes" to a doctor
for a digital (classical) brain, as it might easily overlook some
But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to
emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum
brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323
question at that level.
But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment
with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical
As you wish, but the bill of the duplication will be rather salty. No
conceptual problem here, though.
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