On 09 Nov 2012, at 09:18, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/11/8 meekerdb <[email protected]>
On 11/8/2012 1:14 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/11/8 meekerdb <[email protected]>
On 11/8/2012 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Nov 2012, at 19:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/7/2012 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How can you be in two places at once ?
Your soul, or 1p-you, cannot.
A viewpoint implies a certain place, but I don't see that one can
only be conscious of one place at a time. Consider the operator
in Florida who is operating a drone over Afghanistan. His
consciousness is aware of both places at once.
OK, and with the TV or the net, in that sense most of us are aware
of many places at once, but not in a sense relevant for the 1-
indeterminacy question, I think.
But I think it could be. If the drone pilot were in a more
immersive simulation he might just shift his attention from
Afgahnistan to Florida the same as shifting your attention from
your desk to your monitor. While his body would have a definite
location, his consciousness would not.
As you point yourself by using the words "shifting your attention",
the conscionsness still has a definite location depending on where
the attention of the drone pilot is. He is either focusing on the
Afgahnistan environment or Florida, not both, at no moments he
feels to be at two places at once (I can't imagine what it could be).
Yes, that's the way our minds model the world. But then the
question is where are you when you close your eyes and think about
your childhood or a math problem. So if 'you' can only be one place
at a time, that's just a characteristic of how you think - it's not
equivalent to the fact that a macroscopic object (like you body) can
only be one place at a time. If thinking is computation there is no
reason that thoughts could not included awareness of being two
places at once (like the Borg);
Consciousness is awareness and feelings... Maybe it's a limitation
of my way of thinking, but I can't see it remotely possible to feel
to be in two bodies at once, doing two tasks at once. I can only
consciously focus at any moment on one thing, that does not preclude
fast switching of attention or back and forth attention, but at any
time I feel to be one and only one. When I talks about definite
location, it's not about location in time and space, but the feeling
of wholeness.
I am not sure.
Even keeping comp, I can *imagine* or *conceive* feeling to be in two
places at once. Even keeping comp, I can imagine feeling to be in
both W and M, at once, in the WM-duplication. But then, to keep comp,
and the given definition of 1p used there, the part of me aware to be
in the two places can not been accessible to the separate brain of the
two copies. So that part would feel to be in W and M, and in the usual
non predictible way in each place.
So I would feel like: "the poor guy(s) is still more losing itself in
the terrestrial illusion (to be short)", and of course, nothing
changes in the UD Argument, so that in that case, I, that is that part
of me, would be aware of how my growing ignorance generates the
material reality. Needless to say, that would be a quite *altered*
state of consciousness, and its existence is rather doubtful, but it
is not inconsistent with the comp hypothesis. I think.
I can conceive that with some training, and perhaps drugs, tomorrow's
kids might be able to play different video games at once. Technically,
this would need some "conscious" self-dovetailing procedure, and some
sharable interface.
With dreams, there are evidences that sometimes we do separate dreams
(in both hemispheres, with a sleepy corpus callosum). When we wake up,
we remember the two dreams, and sometimes can be aware they where done
simultaneously, and indeed sometimes related (getting similar pulses
from the stem).
But such states are not related with the fact that the 1p is not
predictible in the 3p duplication of a body coding a person having
access to the memory encoded in that body, which comp allows at the
usual level.
The possibility of having consciousness state non related to bodies,
or related to many bodies, does not prevent the comp logic to go
through, as you will need to add proviso, like above, to avoid magical
(informative) action "at a distance" others than the comp sharing of
dreams (probably reflected in the quantum entanglement).
Bruno
Quentin
something that is approximately realized by the drone pilot.
Brent
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