# Re: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory

```Hi Bruno Marchal

The self-reference to phenomenol perception shows up
in the monad for an object, which is always from that
```
The convolution operator is just a conjecture, since it
appears in systems theory and signal processing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convolution

"In mathematics and, in particular, functional analysis, convolution is a
mathematical operation on two functions
f and g, producing a third function that is typically viewed as a modified
version of one of the original functions,
giving the area overlap between the two functions as a function of the amount
that one of the original functions is
translated. Convolution is similar to cross-correlation. It has applications
that include probability, statistics, c
omputer vision, image and signal processing, electrical engineering, and
differential equations. "

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/17/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2013-01-17, 06:08:26
Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory

On 16 Jan 2013, at 17:30, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I seem to have been using words sloppily. You can't get away with that
with a mathematician :-)

Let me try again.

The phenomenol is what "appears" to be out there.

OK, but it is not only that. In fact, with the exception of truth, all
hypostases are epistemological modalities of self-reference.

And yes, the experience of it is internal.

And you said:

"I am OK with this, but no need of a black post in comp. We need "just"
to relate God-arithmetical-truth, and the machine beliefs. (Bp & p).
That works!"

I was thinking of Secondness as that black box.
With Firstness as the input signal and Thirdness as the
output signal.

That's weird. Of course I use 1p and 3p in some precise technical sense for the
UD argument, and then again in some related sense, but formal, in the interview
of the universal machine.

Then you have a typical linear system
(if that's the right word).

I was suggesting that the box be the convolution function,
as in systems theory.

You might perhaps elaborate on this.

Bruno

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/16/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2013-01-16, 11:02:52
Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory

On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:24, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> The senses convert the phenomenol space-time "world out there"

I don't grasp how something phenomenal can be "out there".

> into nonphysical perceived entities which are stored
> internally as memories.
>
> A memory is experienced internally, so no space-time.

Space-time is also experienced internally. All experience are
"internal".

>
> Then one might say that 1p is the black box that converts
> MY view of the physical into its corresponding
> personal nonphysical state.

I am OK with this, but no need of a black post in comp. We need "just"
to relate God-arithmetical-truth, and the machine beliefs. (Bp & p).
That works!

Bruno

>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 1/16/2013
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Time: 2013-01-15, 08:47:49
> Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects
> Theory
>
>
>
>
> On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 13, 2013 11:57:48 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> Hi Roger,
>
>
> How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal
> dimensions?
>
>
>
>
> I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily
> related to lines and circles),
>
> Lines and circles are spatial geometries.
>
>
>
> They can, but usually I take them as deeper than geometry, but then
> "geometry" is a word having many interpretation too.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves.
> A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its
> neighborhood.
>
> All of those are spatio-temporal sensory experiences and presences.
>
>
> I don't think that an experience can be spatio-temporal. With comp I
> argued that space-time emerges from coherence conditions on "deep
> dreams/computations".
> It looks like you are working in a theory which assume some
> primitive space time.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> A purely mathematical wave which is independent of all spatial or
> temporal representation can only be a figurative wave. If you have
> concretely real substances in 'space' or concretely real experiences
> in 'time' then you can have a figurative language which refers to
> the wavy qualities which we infer through sense as being correlated
> on either side of the public-private range of presentation. This
> wavy-ness is an idea, a metaphorical figure which we use to re-
> present the commonality which we understand internally but as an
> exteriorized, generic symbol.
>
>
>
> As you know, with comp, it is the "concrete real substance" which
> belong to the (quite useful locally) metaphors.
>
>
>
>
>
> Once we have formalized this synthetic wave figure quantitatively,
> we can do all kinds of incredible things with it, just as a painter
> uses a certain kind of brushstroke. But the strokeness isn't a thing
> itself - it has no power to do anything by itself, it is pure
> fiction (albeit fiction which is informative about sense on all
> levels of realism, but only from the fictional 3p voyeur perspective).
>
>
>
> That is coherent with non-comp, indeed. But I have no faith in
> substances.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>
>
> Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces),
> so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of "arbitrary"
> functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural
> restrictions here).
>
>
> The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical
> interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make
> them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum
> waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical
> realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an
> electron, for an example.
> I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the
> non physical relations between numbers).
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi everything-list,
>
> I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI.
> Here's why:
>
> I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect,
> due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves
> are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic.
>
> This seems to deny "quantum weirdness" observed
> in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave
> and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird
> happening.
>
> My own view is that the weirdness arises because the
> waves and the photons are residents of two completely
> different but interpenetrating worlds, where:
>
> 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world,
> where by physical I mean (along with Descartes)
> "extended in space",
>
> 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of
> the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no
> extension in space.
>
> Under these conditions, there is no need
> to create an additional physical world, since each
> can exist as aspects of the the same world,
> one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like
> mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world
> beyond spacetime.
>
> [Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
> 1/12/2013
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
>
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