On Sunday, January 27, 2013 8:09:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 25 Jan 2013, at 20:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Friday, January 25, 2013 2:16:02 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 24 Jan 2013, at 22:03, Jason Resch wrote:
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>> John,
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>> I agree with Craig.  The concept of divine simplicity exists in several 
>> religions ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_simplicity ). 
>>
>>
>> Little numbers can develop crazy complex behaviors, and with comp they 
>> can support (locally) rich inner experiences. 
>> The difficulty relies in the first person statistical fitness with the 
>> probable universal neighbors. (As you can guess).
>>
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> Makes me think of superfluid helium...
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> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Z6UJbwxBZI
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> As simplicity approaches the absolute (and -271K He is an interesting 
> range of simplicity in matter) it seems to expose the hidden complexity of 
> our expectations for what is minimal. Of course, I point to this to show 
> again that arithmetic truth and information float on the surface of an 
> ocean of permanent and expanding sensory depth.
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>
> I would like a semi-axiomatic definition of "sensory", to make this more 
> palatable. I try to get a theory of sense, and I can't take that notion for 
> granted, even if I agree that from the 1p pov, it looks like primitive (but 
> that the comp theory can already explained why).
>

Sensory is primitive, but comp can't explain it because explanation is only 
a motive which seeks to translate one sensory experience into another 
sensory mode. 

It's not that you agree from the 1p POV, it is that you have no choice but 
to agree - all that your 1p POV consists of is sensory experience. There is 
nothing else that it can ever consist of, and of course there is no 3p POV 
except in the explanation of multiple 1p experiences.

I think it's useful to talk about sensory experience as 'afferent 
phenomenology' or maybe 'private participation' (whereas motor or motive 
activity would be public-facing participation). Note that you can have a 
public experience in a dream, but the sense of realism of waking public 
experience is, under most conditions, more significant in comparison. 
Without the comparison, a dream can seem real, but usually being awake 
seems clearly different from a dream. I think that's not because of 
differences in the logic of the experiential content, but because of 
sub-personal and super-personal (unconscious) sensory connection.

Sense is always the connection from one 1p state to another or from a 1p 
state to its 3p reflection; bridging the literal and the figurative 
(understanding), the figurative and the figurative (poetry), or the literal 
and the literal (physics), or even the figuratively literal (logic) and the 
literally figurative (math).

Deleuze has some interesting things to say about sense - about how it 
exists on the surfaces rather than the depths. I would agree in the way 
that synapses are important neurological sites or the junctions of a 
transistor are important. I think that sense is the way that the depths 
from each other, and/or that division accumulates depth. They are the same 
thing, except that the surface is foreground-active from our empirical 
perspective as nested participants in timespace, while the surface is 
background-irrelevant from an absolute perspective as surfaces require 
timespace to manifest. Without timespace, at the absolute scale, there is 
no 3p as there is only a totality of depths.

Craig


> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
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