On 27 Jan 2013, at 15:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Sunday, January 27, 2013 8:09:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I would like a semi-axiomatic definition of "sensory", to make this more palatable. I try to get a theory of sense, and I can't take that notion for granted, even if I agree that from the 1p pov, it looks like primitive (but that the comp theory can already explained why).

Sensory is primitive,

Of course, in the comp theory, sensory is not primitive. It only feels like primitive, exactly like a part of matter looks like being primitive. Comp explains those feeling, except for a tiny part that it still explain has to remain unexplainable.



but comp can't explain it because explanation is only a motive which seeks to translate one sensory experience into another sensory mode.

That's correct, but this cannot been applied validly to refute comp. Similar remarks for what follows.

Bruno





It's not that you agree from the 1p POV, it is that you have no choice but to agree - all that your 1p POV consists of is sensory experience. There is nothing else that it can ever consist of, and of course there is no 3p POV except in the explanation of multiple 1p experiences.

I think it's useful to talk about sensory experience as 'afferent phenomenology' or maybe 'private participation' (whereas motor or motive activity would be public-facing participation). Note that you can have a public experience in a dream, but the sense of realism of waking public experience is, under most conditions, more significant in comparison. Without the comparison, a dream can seem real, but usually being awake seems clearly different from a dream. I think that's not because of differences in the logic of the experiential content, but because of sub-personal and super-personal (unconscious) sensory connection.

Sense is always the connection from one 1p state to another or from a 1p state to its 3p reflection; bridging the literal and the figurative (understanding), the figurative and the figurative (poetry), or the literal and the literal (physics), or even the figuratively literal (logic) and the literally figurative (math).

Deleuze has some interesting things to say about sense - about how it exists on the surfaces rather than the depths. I would agree in the way that synapses are important neurological sites or the junctions of a transistor are important. I think that sense is the way that the depths from each other, and/or that division accumulates depth. They are the same thing, except that the surface is foreground-active from our empirical perspective as nested participants in timespace, while the surface is background- irrelevant from an absolute perspective as surfaces require timespace to manifest. Without timespace, at the absolute scale, there is no 3p as there is only a totality of depths.

Craig


Bruno





Craig


Bruno



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