On 27 Jan 2013, at 15:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, January 27, 2013 8:09:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would like a semi-axiomatic definition of "sensory", to make this
more palatable. I try to get a theory of sense, and I can't take
that notion for granted, even if I agree that from the 1p pov, it
looks like primitive (but that the comp theory can already explained
why).
Sensory is primitive,
Of course, in the comp theory, sensory is not primitive. It only feels
like primitive, exactly like a part of matter looks like being
primitive. Comp explains those feeling, except for a tiny part that it
still explain has to remain unexplainable.
but comp can't explain it because explanation is only a motive which
seeks to translate one sensory experience into another sensory mode.
That's correct, but this cannot been applied validly to refute comp.
Similar remarks for what follows.
Bruno
It's not that you agree from the 1p POV, it is that you have no
choice but to agree - all that your 1p POV consists of is sensory
experience. There is nothing else that it can ever consist of, and
of course there is no 3p POV except in the explanation of multiple
1p experiences.
I think it's useful to talk about sensory experience as 'afferent
phenomenology' or maybe 'private participation' (whereas motor or
motive activity would be public-facing participation). Note that you
can have a public experience in a dream, but the sense of realism of
waking public experience is, under most conditions, more significant
in comparison. Without the comparison, a dream can seem real, but
usually being awake seems clearly different from a dream. I think
that's not because of differences in the logic of the experiential
content, but because of sub-personal and super-personal
(unconscious) sensory connection.
Sense is always the connection from one 1p state to another or from
a 1p state to its 3p reflection; bridging the literal and the
figurative (understanding), the figurative and the figurative
(poetry), or the literal and the literal (physics), or even the
figuratively literal (logic) and the literally figurative (math).
Deleuze has some interesting things to say about sense - about how
it exists on the surfaces rather than the depths. I would agree in
the way that synapses are important neurological sites or the
junctions of a transistor are important. I think that sense is the
way that the depths from each other, and/or that division
accumulates depth. They are the same thing, except that the surface
is foreground-active from our empirical perspective as nested
participants in timespace, while the surface is background-
irrelevant from an absolute perspective as surfaces require
timespace to manifest. Without timespace, at the absolute scale,
there is no 3p as there is only a totality of depths.
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
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