On 24 Mar 2013, at 12:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 24, 2013 7:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Mar 2013, at 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 1:28:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Mar 2013, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130320115111.htm
"We are examining the activity in the cerebral cortex as a whole.
The brain is a non-stop, always-active system. When we perceive
something, the information does not end up in a specific part of
our brain. Rather, it is added to the brain's existing activity.
If we measure the electrochemical activity of the whole cortex, we
find wave-like patterns. This shows that brain activity is not
local but rather that activity constantly moves from one part of
the brain to another."
Please, don't confuse the very particular neuro-philosophy with the
much weaker assumption of computationalism.
Wave-like pattern are typically computable functions.
(I mentioned this when saying that I would say yes to a doctor only
if he copies my glial cells at the right chemical level).
There are just no evidence for non computable activities acting in
a relevant way in the biological organism, or actually even in the
physical universe.
You could point on the the wave packet reduction, but it does not
make much sense by itself.
Right, I'm not arguing this as evidence of non-comp. Even if there
was non-comp activity in the brain, nothing that we could use to
detect it would be able to find anything since we would only know
how to use an exrternal detection instrument computationally.
Mainly I posted this to show the direction that the scientific
evidence is leading us does not support any kind of narrow folk-
neuroscience of point to point chain-reactions.
Good.
Not looking very charitable to the bottom-up, neuron machine view.
Ideas don't need charity but in this case it is totally
charitable, even with neurophilosophy, given that in your example,
those waves still seem neuron driven.
How do you know that it seem neuron driven rather than whole brain
driven?
In neurophilosophy, they are used to global complex and distributed
brain activity, but still implemented in term of local computable
rules obeyed by neurons.
If you look at a city traffic pattern, you will see local computable
rules obeyed by cars, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-
computable agendas being pursued by the drivers.
Indeed.
But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. If you
look at the computer's functioning, you will see local computable
rules obeyed by the gates, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-
computable agendas being pursued by genuine person supported by those
computations.
What would it look like if the brain as a whole were driving the
neurons?
Either it would be like saying that a high level program can have a
feedback on some of its low level implementations, which is not a
problem at all, as this already exist, in both biology and computer
science, or it would be like saying that a brain can break the
physical laws, or the arithmetical laws and it would be like pseudo-
philosophy.
What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - like
the ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc and the
programs which support them?
To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable universal
neighbors. The relations can be complicated.
Not between the high level program and the low level program, but
between the X-Level truths and laws and all local functions?
Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet and
theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you get the full
arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i formula, well beyond the
computable. It is not easy, but there are mathematical lanterns, and
deep symmetries, and deep self-referential insight.
It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid.
It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in
arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, problem.
There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all universal
machines at once, nothing is easy.
You have to look inward, eventually.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
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