On 3/24/2013 8:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Sunday, March 24, 2013 6:15:53 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > > On 3/24/2013 3:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, March 24, 2013 1:44:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Mar 2013, at 12:53, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 24, 2013 7:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Mar 2013, at 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013 1:28:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno >>>> Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20 Mar 2013, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130320115111.htm >>>>> >>>>> <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130320115111.htm> >>>>> >>>>> "We are examining the activity in the cerebral >>>>> cortex /as a whole/. The brain is a non-stop, >>>>> always-active system. When we perceive something, >>>>> the information does not end up in a specific >>>>> /part/ of our brain. Rather, it is added to the >>>>> brain's existing activity. If we measure the >>>>> electrochemical activity of the whole cortex, we >>>>> find wave-like patterns. This shows that brain >>>>> activity is not local but rather that activity >>>>> constantly moves from one part of the brain to >>>>> another." >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Please, don't confuse the very particular >>>> neuro-philosophy with the much weaker assumption of >>>> computationalism. >>>> Wave-like pattern are typically computable functions. >>>> (I mentioned this when saying that I would say yes >>>> to a doctor only if he copies my glial cells at the >>>> right chemical level). >>>> >>>> There are just no evidence for non computable >>>> activities acting in a relevant way in the >>>> biological organism, or actually even in the >>>> physical universe. >>>> You could point on the the wave packet reduction, >>>> but it does not make much sense by itself. >>>> >>>> >>>> Right, I'm not arguing this as evidence of non-comp. >>>> Even if there was non-comp activity in the brain, >>>> nothing that we could use to detect it would be able to >>>> find anything since we would only know how to use an >>>> exrternal detection instrument computationally. Mainly >>>> I posted this to show the direction that the scientific >>>> evidence is leading us does not support any kind of >>>> narrow folk-neuroscience of point to point chain-reactions. >>> >>> >>> Good. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not looking very charitable to the bottom-up, >>>>> neuron machine view. >>>> >>>> Ideas don't need charity but in this case it is >>>> totally charitable, even with neurophilosophy, >>>> given that in your example, those waves still seem >>>> neuron driven. >>>> >>>> >>>> How do you know that it seem neuron driven rather than >>>> whole brain driven? >>> >>> In neurophilosophy, they are used to global complex and >>> distributed brain activity, but still implemented in >>> term of local computable rules obeyed by neurons. >>> >>> >>> If you look at a city traffic pattern, you will see local >>> computable rules obeyed by cars, but that doesn't mean there >>> aren't non-computable agendas being pursued by the drivers. >> >> Indeed. >> >> But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. >> If you look at the computer's functioning, you will see local >> computable rules obeyed by the gates, but that doesn't mean >> there aren't non-computable agendas being pursued by genuine >> person supported by those computations. >> >> >> Absolutely, but does it mean that it has to be a genuine person? > > Hi Craig, > > We must first admit that there does not exist a 3p > representation of what it is like to be a genuine person! > Therefore this qustion is off the mark. > > > Hi Stephen, > > I agree no 3p representation can tell serve as evidence of personhood > (although I do not think that means that we can't have a sense which > goes beyond the 3p intuitively or instinctively, but what I'm talking > about is more of the zombie question. Just because a simulation fools > a high number of observers doesn't mean that it isn't a simulation, > i.e. the best Elvis impersonator is not any closer to becoming Elvis > Aaron Presley than they are to becoming Groucho Marx.
Hi, Right, but here is what I am proposing: In the limit of computational resources, the best possible simulation of an object *is* the object itself. Any simulation of it would be, by definition 'a simulation' and your point would be made. > > > >> To me it makes sense that the natural development of persons may >> be restricted to experiences which are represented publicly in >> zoological terms. The zoological format is not the cause of the >> experience but it is the minimum vessel with the proper scale of >> sensitivity for that quality of experience to be supported. >> Trying to generate the same thing from the bottom up may not be >> feasible, because the zoological format arises organically, >> whereas an AI system skips zoology, biology, and chemistry >> entirely and assumes a universally low format. > > It makes sense to you, sure, but we need to talk about things > given the fact above. We can beat around the bush forever ... > > > That's up to everyone else, all that I can do is explain why it makes > sense to me. Well, we cannot invent private languages and expect others to understand us. :_( > > > >> >> Consciousness does not seem to be compatible with low level >> unconscious origins to me. > > Why? Are molecules 'alive'? We do not have a measure of what > it is to be alive!!!! Maybe a global measure does not exist and we > need to stop looking for one! > > > Because a collection of a billion ping pong balls isn't any more > conscious than a dozen. There's just no logical expectation of any > kind of experiential qualities appearing in a universe which already > contains fully functional unconscious systems. Ah, but what if those ping pong balls in motion are acting out the functions required to compute a simulation of the motion of the center of mass of that collection of ping pong balls? > > As far as defining life, I agree, it is a relative and qualitative > concept. It would help to start with a list of yes/no questions... and end up some how with a definition: the list and its answers from all available answerers of the question. > Like the mind body problem, in which we can say in one sense that mind > and body are irreconcilable by nature and in another that they are > seamlessly integrated, so too is life on the one hand indiscernible as > a category of phenomena - the difference between what a virus does and > what a parasite does, or the growth of a crystal vs the growth of a > fungus...these are hard to draw a line, but in the life of a person, > the division between life and death could not be clearer under most > circumstances. In the end I think that we can neither expect life to > be definable nor can it be dismissed. It, like consciousness, is > actually more fundamental than definition itself. Ah, your overcomplicating it! Consciousness should apply to the simplest possible object. We are all hung up on questions of reportability and fail to note that reportability requires a 3p. Consciousness is not 3p, so ... If we cannot *prove* that X is conscious, it is best assume that it might be. No harm can come if it is not and if we assume global panpsychism, it traces out. Win Win. > > >> Looking at language, the rules of spelling and grammar do not >> drive the creation of new words. > > _Looking at them_ no, but _using them_ can lead to the > creation of new worlds. Novelists do this constantly. > > > For sure, the semiotic characteristics are a major source of > inspiration for neologisms, etc. It's always a push and pull, > nature/nurture interaction. At every level though, it is still the > user who cares about any of it and not the rules. The user uses rules, > the rules have no stake in what the user does, and indeed they have no > existence at all independent of all forms of user sense. Aye. > > > > >> A word cannot be forced into common usage just because it is >> introduced into a culture. There is no rule in language which has >> a function of creating new words, nor could any rule like that >> possibly work. If you could control the behavior of language use >> from the bottom up however, you could simulate that such a rule >> would work, just by programming people to utter it with >> increasing frequency. This would satisfy any third person test >> for the effectiveness of the rule, but of course would be >> completely meaningless. > > ISTM that you are just restating a semantically different > version of Matiyasevish's proof that there does not exist an > algorithm that can automatically prove mathematical theorem. > > > I'm not familiar with it, but it could be related. I'm talking more > about the the notion that there exist phenomena which have nothing at > all to do with rules, logic, or mathematics. Feelings, experience, and > sense are more fundamental and can harden into rules, etc, but rules > and logic, if they existed independently of feeling, could never > construct any kind of feeling or experience. Look: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert's_tenth_problem "Occasionally it happens that we seek the solution under insufficient hypotheses or in an incorrect sense, and for this reason do not succeed. The problem then arises: to show the impossibility of the solution under the given hypotheses or in the sense contemplated." > > > >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> What would it look like if the brain as a whole were >>>> driving the neurons? >>> >>> Either it would be like saying that a high level program >>> can have a feedback on some of its low level >>> implementations, which is not a problem at all, as this >>> already exist, in both biology and computer science, or >>> it would be like saying that a brain can break the >>> physical laws, or the arithmetical laws and it would be >>> like pseudo-philosophy. >>> >>> >>> What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - >>> like the ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc >>> and the programs which support them? >> >> To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable >> universal neighbors. The relations can be complicated. >> >> >> Their being complicated is what I would expect from high level >> laws - but how is it that low level processes wind up being >> influenced by them? How does the law that says dumb code can >> begin to think for itself come to be followed by dumb code? > > OK, so we need a way to index things... But then we will have > to index the indexing and index the indexing of the .. > > > It seems easier if the indexing is more primitive than the data being > indexed. If I can index, then I can make anything into data, but if I > only have data, it doesn't seem like it can be coerced into indexing > itself. It does seem easier, but what is being contemplated is the ability to include the data in the index itself as a call function... No need to source the data locally. A word, like "tree" is not an instance of an actual tree... > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> Not between the high level program and the low level >>> program, but between the X-Level truths and laws and all >>> local functions? >> >> >> Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet >> and theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you >> get the full arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i >> formula, well beyond the computable. It is not easy, but >> there are mathematical lanterns, and deep symmetries, and >> deep self-referential insight. >> It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid. >> >> It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in >> arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, >> problem. >> There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all >> universal machines at once, nothing is easy. >> You have to look inward, eventually. >> >> >> I won't be able to understand that, but it seems to me that if >> exotic capabilities like 1p awareness can be made up of dumb >> programmatic elements, then the top-down influence of potential >> intelligence must be equally important as the bottom-up blind >> stacking of logical operators. It seems like you want it both >> ways - that the higher order arithmetic magic of UMs are both >> separate from the primitive machines of today, but the potential >> for magic is inherent and inevitable strictly from inferences of >> the lowest arithmetic truths. > > But we do need it both ways! > > > We can do it both ways, but we should understand that only the > top-down, inside-out replication can ever result in genuine high level > awareness, while the bottom-up, outside-in engineering can only ever > result in prosthetic extensions which are dependent on some other > awareness. The second way is ultimate the more desirable route to > developing technology to serve the quality of public human life, but > the first way is the only way to understand the physics of privacy and > experience. > Rubbish. You are trying desperately to claim a new version vitalism <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vitalism> with this line of reasoning. Stop now! Nature is not that simple. -- Onward! 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