On 24 Mar 2013, at 20:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 24, 2013 1:44:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Mar 2013, at 12:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 24, 2013 7:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Mar 2013, at 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 21, 2013 1:28:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Mar 2013, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130320115111.htm
"We are examining the activity in the cerebral cortex as a whole.
The brain is a non-stop, always-active system. When we perceive
something, the information does not end up in a specific part of
our brain. Rather, it is added to the brain's existing activity.
If we measure the electrochemical activity of the whole cortex,
we find wave-like patterns. This shows that brain activity is not
local but rather that activity constantly moves from one part of
the brain to another."
Please, don't confuse the very particular neuro-philosophy with
the much weaker assumption of computationalism.
Wave-like pattern are typically computable functions.
(I mentioned this when saying that I would say yes to a doctor
only if he copies my glial cells at the right chemical level).
There are just no evidence for non computable activities acting in
a relevant way in the biological organism, or actually even in the
physical universe.
You could point on the the wave packet reduction, but it does not
make much sense by itself.
Right, I'm not arguing this as evidence of non-comp. Even if there
was non-comp activity in the brain, nothing that we could use to
detect it would be able to find anything since we would only know
how to use an exrternal detection instrument computationally.
Mainly I posted this to show the direction that the scientific
evidence is leading us does not support any kind of narrow folk-
neuroscience of point to point chain-reactions.
Good.
Not looking very charitable to the bottom-up, neuron machine view.
Ideas don't need charity but in this case it is totally
charitable, even with neurophilosophy, given that in your example,
those waves still seem neuron driven.
How do you know that it seem neuron driven rather than whole brain
driven?
In neurophilosophy, they are used to global complex and distributed
brain activity, but still implemented in term of local computable
rules obeyed by neurons.
If you look at a city traffic pattern, you will see local
computable rules obeyed by cars, but that doesn't mean there aren't
non-computable agendas being pursued by the drivers.
Indeed.
But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. If you
look at the computer's functioning, you will see local computable
rules obeyed by the gates, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-
computable agendas being pursued by genuine person supported by
those computations.
Absolutely, but does it mean that it has to be a genuine person? To
me it makes sense that the natural development of persons may be
restricted to experiences which are represented publicly in
zoological terms. The zoological format is not the cause of the
experience but it is the minimum vessel with the proper scale of
sensitivity for that quality of experience to be supported. Trying
to generate the same thing from the bottom up may not be feasible,
because the zoological format arises organically, whereas an AI
system skips zoology, biology, and chemistry entirely and assumes a
universally low format.
It is does not. Self-reference leads machine to develop multi-variated
leves of "formatting".
Consciousness does not seem to be compatible with low level
unconscious origins to me. Looking at language, the rules of
spelling and grammar do not drive the creation of new words. A word
cannot be forced into common usage just because it is introduced
into a culture. There is no rule in language which has a function of
creating new words, nor could any rule like that possibly work.
You ignore completely the notion of creative set or universal machine.
You talk like if we could have a complete theory about them, but we
can't, provably so if we are Turing emulable.
You just communicate your feeling where the machine already can
explain why their feeling can be misleading on this subject.
If you could control the behavior of language use from the bottom up
however, you could simulate that such a rule would work, just by
programming people to utter it with increasing frequency. This would
satisfy any third person test for the effectiveness of the rule, but
of course would be completely meaningless.
Don't confuse machine and language.
What would it look like if the brain as a whole were driving the
neurons?
Either it would be like saying that a high level program can have a
feedback on some of its low level implementations, which is not a
problem at all, as this already exist, in both biology and computer
science, or it would be like saying that a brain can break the
physical laws, or the arithmetical laws and it would be like pseudo-
philosophy.
What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - like
the ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc and the
programs which support them?
To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable universal
neighbors. The relations can be complicated.
Their being complicated is what I would expect from high level laws
- but how is it that low level processes wind up being influenced by
them? How does the law that says dumb code can begin to think for
itself come to be followed by dumb code?
?
Not between the high level program and the low level program, but
between the X-Level truths and laws and all local functions?
Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet and
theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you get the
full arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i formula, well
beyond the computable. It is not easy, but there are mathematical
lanterns, and deep symmetries, and deep self-referential insight.
It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid.
It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in
arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, problem.
There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all universal
machines at once, nothing is easy.
You have to look inward, eventually.
I won't be able to understand that, but it seems to me that if
exotic capabilities like 1p awareness can be made up of dumb
programmatic elements, then the top-down influence of potential
intelligence must be equally important as the bottom-up blind
stacking of logical operators. It seems like you want it both ways -
that the higher order arithmetic magic of UMs are both separate from
the primitive machines of today, but the potential for magic is
inherent and inevitable strictly from inferences of the lowest
arithmetic truths.
Not at all, they are beyond. You still think about arithmetic like if
incompleteness wasn't discovered.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
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