On 3/24/2013 3:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Sunday, March 24, 2013 1:44:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 24 Mar 2013, at 12:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> On Sunday, March 24, 2013 7:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 21 Mar 2013, at 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013 1:28:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
>>> On 20 Mar 2013, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>> "We are examining the activity in the cerebral cortex
>>>> /as a whole/. The brain is a non-stop, always-active
>>>> system. When we perceive something, the information
>>>> does not end up in a specific /part/ of our brain.
>>>> Rather, it is added to the brain's existing activity.
>>>> If we measure the electrochemical activity of the whole
>>>> cortex, we find wave-like patterns. This shows that
>>>> brain activity is not local but rather that activity
>>>> constantly moves from one part of the brain to another."
>>> Please, don't confuse the very particular
>>> neuro-philosophy with the much weaker assumption of
>>> Wave-like pattern are typically computable functions.
>>> (I mentioned this when saying that I would say yes to a
>>> doctor only if he copies my glial cells at the right
>>> chemical level).
>>> There are just no evidence for non computable activities
>>> acting in a relevant way in the biological organism, or
>>> actually even in the physical universe.
>>> You could point on the the wave packet reduction, but it
>>> does not make much sense by itself.
>>> Right, I'm not arguing this as evidence of non-comp. Even if
>>> there was non-comp activity in the brain, nothing that we
>>> could use to detect it would be able to find anything since
>>> we would only know how to use an exrternal detection
>>> instrument computationally. Mainly I posted this to show the
>>> direction that the scientific evidence is leading us does
>>> not support any kind of narrow folk-neuroscience of point to
>>> point chain-reactions.
>>>> Not looking very charitable to the bottom-up, neuron
>>>> machine view.
>>> Ideas don't need charity but in this case it is totally
>>> charitable, even with neurophilosophy, given that in
>>> your example, those waves still seem neuron driven.
>>> How do you know that it seem neuron driven rather than whole
>>> brain driven?
>> In neurophilosophy, they are used to global complex and
>> distributed brain activity, but still implemented in term of
>> local computable rules obeyed by neurons.
>> If you look at a city traffic pattern, you will see local
>> computable rules obeyed by cars, but that doesn't mean there
>> aren't non-computable agendas being pursued by the drivers.
> But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. If you
> look at the computer's functioning, you will see local computable
> rules obeyed by the gates, but that doesn't mean there aren't
> non-computable agendas being pursued by genuine person supported
> by those computations.
> Absolutely, but does it mean that it has to be a genuine person?
We must first admit that there does not exist a 3p representation of
what it is like to be a genuine person! Therefore this qustion is off
> To me it makes sense that the natural development of persons may be
> restricted to experiences which are represented publicly in zoological
> terms. The zoological format is not the cause of the experience but it
> is the minimum vessel with the proper scale of sensitivity for that
> quality of experience to be supported. Trying to generate the same
> thing from the bottom up may not be feasible, because the zoological
> format arises organically, whereas an AI system skips zoology,
> biology, and chemistry entirely and assumes a universally low format.
It makes sense to you, sure, but we need to talk about things given
the fact above. We can beat around the bush forever ...
> Consciousness does not seem to be compatible with low level
> unconscious origins to me.
Why? Are molecules 'alive'? We do not have a measure of what it is
to be alive!!!! Maybe a global measure does not exist and we need to
stop looking for one!
> Looking at language, the rules of spelling and grammar do not drive
> the creation of new words.
_Looking at them_ no, but _using them_ can lead to the creation of
new worlds. Novelists do this constantly.
> A word cannot be forced into common usage just because it is
> introduced into a culture. There is no rule in language which has a
> function of creating new words, nor could any rule like that possibly
> work. If you could control the behavior of language use from the
> bottom up however, you could simulate that such a rule would work,
> just by programming people to utter it with increasing frequency. This
> would satisfy any third person test for the effectiveness of the rule,
> but of course would be completely meaningless.
ISTM that you are just restating a semantically different version of
Matiyasevish's proof that there does not exist an algorithm that can
automatically prove mathematical theorem.
>>> What would it look like if the brain as a whole were driving
>>> the neurons?
>> Either it would be like saying that a high level program can
>> have a feedback on some of its low level implementations,
>> which is not a problem at all, as this already exist, in both
>> biology and computer science, or it would be like saying that
>> a brain can break the physical laws, or the arithmetical laws
>> and it would be like pseudo-philosophy.
>> What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - like
>> the ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc and the
>> programs which support them?
> To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable universal
> neighbors. The relations can be complicated.
> Their being complicated is what I would expect from high level laws -
> but how is it that low level processes wind up being influenced by
> them? How does the law that says dumb code can begin to think for
> itself come to be followed by dumb code?
OK, so we need a way to index things... But then we will have to
index the indexing and index the indexing of the ..
>> Not between the high level program and the low level program, but
>> between the X-Level truths and laws and all local functions?
> Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet and
> theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you get the
> full arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i formula, well
> beyond the computable. It is not easy, but there are mathematical
> lanterns, and deep symmetries, and deep self-referential insight.
> It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid.
> It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in
> arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, problem.
> There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all
> universal machines at once, nothing is easy.
> You have to look inward, eventually.
> I won't be able to understand that, but it seems to me that if exotic
> capabilities like 1p awareness can be made up of dumb programmatic
> elements, then the top-down influence of potential intelligence must
> be equally important as the bottom-up blind stacking of logical
> operators. It seems like you want it both ways - that the higher order
> arithmetic magic of UMs are both separate from the primitive machines
> of today, but the potential for magic is inherent and inevitable
> strictly from inferences of the lowest arithmetic truths.
But we do need it both ways!
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