On Sun, Mar 24, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Mar 2013, at 13:46, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 6:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If > > my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my > > infinitely > > many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and this gives > > ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way than by > > doing > > QM. > > > > That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu? > > > > Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical explanation > > of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know. > > > Agreed, I was 99% kidding. > > > No problem. I was 1% arguing :) > > > > I believe that randomness is related > > to creativity. > > > > No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of creativity. > > > Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is creative, > > in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing Universal. > > > Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like > > Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it useless. > > > randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can develop > > some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning measure in the > > rize of the sharable physical laws. > > > But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is still > > independent of it. > > > I still find it hard to grasp how we could have a creative process > without some degree of random exploration. > > > Why random. Pseudo random can be enough, or the natural randomness contained > in the computable. > No machine can distinguish randomness from the behavior of a more complex > machine than herself,
Nice! >so I think that the kind of randomness and > indetermination that you invoke in creativity is already there, in many form > and shape in the computable. But it's interesting how you always need to bootstrap the process with something external to the machine. Take the pseudo-random generator. To create different scenarios with a same algorithm that uses it, you need different seeds. I can't think of a way for the Turing machine to seed itself. You can chose a number of seeds yourself, read a clock, use thermal readings from the processor and so on. But I can't think of a way to avoid the exterior. See my problem? > The point I made is conceptual: what I say is that we don't need real pure > randomness. We have it by the first person indeterminacy, but its role is > more in the statistical stabilization of the computable than used as a tool > in creativity, fro which the computable is enough random per se. Ok, I think I grasp what you mean. But what about a finite turing machine (as I assume the brain is)? I'm still struggling with my previous observation. > > > > > > > > > One of the things that always bothered me with Roger > > Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical > > computer, but real computers have random number generators* that > > exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness. > > > > Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true randomness, but > > below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how to make a > > qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but even just that > > is technically quite challenging. > > > Ok (I wish I had such neighbours). Still, even pseudo-random > generators seeded by clock time can provide you with a strem of > numbers that likely have very low correlation with the system you're > modelling, so random in a certain sense. I guess what humans call > creativity could just be a class of algorithms for which it's not > trivial to follow causality chains. > > > Indeed, and for free will it is the same, when a machine is looking at > herself and trying to take a decision in a situation with very partial > information, which is quickly the natural situation above some threshold of > complexity, with respect to the most probable local Turing base. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > This has > > non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary > > computation / alife will probably agree. > > > > > In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not just the > > random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role other than > > the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle, but who knows ... > > > > > > > > * even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for > > example > > > That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a quantum > > computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp > > substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the Turing > > emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable from the > > indeterminacy on the whole UD*). > > > > Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem to > > COMP. > > > > OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all > > machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer, or a > > totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be the > > product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or FPPI) > > computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy computations). > > Best, > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Principal, High Performance Coders > > Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] > > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > > an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > > an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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