On Sun, Mar 24, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 21 Mar 2013, at 13:46, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 6:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Mar 2013, at 17:34, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> So here the speed is of conceptual importance. If
>
> my brain is a QC I can do a Fourier transform of the state of my
>
> infinitely
>
> many doppelgangers in some superposition states of myself, and this gives
>
> ways to confirm the quantum many-world in a less indirect way than by
>
> doing
>
> QM.
>
>
>
> That would be a cool explanation for the feeling of deja-vu?
>
>
>
> Cool, perhaps. Probable? I don't think so. There are classical explanation
>
> of that phenomenon. Which one is correct I don't know.
>
>
> Agreed, I was 99% kidding.
>
>
> No problem. I was 1% arguing :)
>
>
>
> I believe that randomness is related
>
> to creativity.
>
>
>
> No, randomness has not the redundancy which is the mark of creativity.
>
>
> Post number (ith digit = 1 if phi_i(i) stops, and zero if not) is creative,
>
> in the sense of Emil Post, and corresponds to the Turing Universal.
>
>
> Algorithmic randomness (the most random thing we can conceive, like
>
> Chaitin's Omega, which is a compression of Post number, render it useless.
>
>
> randomness is useful, tough, for making the computation which can develop
>
> some relation with it, like the quantum, having a winning measure in the
>
> rize of the sharable physical laws.
>
>
> But still, I tend to bet that creativity, if he can exploit it, is still
>
> independent of it.
>
>
> I still find it hard to grasp how we could have a creative process
> without some degree of random exploration.
>
>
> Why random. Pseudo random can be enough, or the natural randomness contained
> in the computable.
> No machine can distinguish randomness from the behavior of a more complex
> machine than herself,

Nice!

>so I think that the kind of randomness and
> indetermination that you invoke in creativity is already there, in many form
> and shape in the computable.

But it's interesting how you always need to bootstrap the process with
something external to the machine. Take the pseudo-random generator.
To create different scenarios with a same algorithm that uses it, you
need different seeds. I can't think of a way for the Turing machine to
seed itself. You can chose a number of seeds yourself, read a clock,
use thermal readings from the processor and so on. But I can't think
of a way to avoid the exterior. See my problem?

> The point I made is conceptual: what I say is that we don't need real pure
> randomness. We have it by the first person indeterminacy, but its role is
> more in the statistical stabilization of the computable than used as a  tool
> in creativity, fro which the computable is enough random per se.

Ok, I think I grasp what you mean. But what about a finite turing
machine (as I assume the brain is)? I'm still struggling with my
previous observation.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> One of the things that always bothered me with Roger
>
> Penrose's argument is that he considers a theoretical classical
>
> computer, but real computers have random number generators* that
>
> exploit non Turing-emulable sources of randomness.
>
>
>
> Rarely. Only A qubit, or a self-duplication, can give true randomness, but
>
> below my story in the building I work, they work precisely on how to make a
>
> qubit such that a measurement would be provably random, but even just that
>
> is technically quite challenging.
>
>
> Ok (I wish I had such neighbours). Still, even pseudo-random
> generators seeded by clock time can provide you with a strem of
> numbers that likely have very low correlation with the system you're
> modelling, so random in a certain sense. I guess what humans call
> creativity could just be a class of algorithms for which it's not
> trivial to follow causality chains.
>
>
> Indeed, and for free will it is the same, when a machine is looking at
> herself and trying to take a decision in a situation with very partial
> information, which is quickly the natural situation above some threshold of
> complexity, with respect to the most probable local Turing base.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> This has
>
> non-trivial implications, and anyone who played with evolutionary
>
> computation / alife will probably agree.
>
>
>
>
> In the UD, we are, in principle dependent on *all* oracles, not just the
>
> random one. There are many oracles. I doubt that they play a role other than
>
> the halting oracle (time, somehow) and the random oracle, but who knows ...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> * even pseudo-number generators can be seeded by the clock time, for
>
> example
>
>
> That would change nothing in UDA and AUDA. If the brain is a quantum
>
> computer, it would only mean something on the lowness of the comp
>
> substitution level, and a more complex back and forth between the Turing
>
> emulable and the first person indeterminacy (Turing recoverable from the
>
> indeterminacy on the whole UD*).
>
>
>
> Sure, I did not assume that the brain as a QC would pose a problem to
>
> COMP.
>
>
>
> OK. In Z1*, the arithmetical quantization gives hope to show that all
>
> machines, having deep histories, are related to a quantum computer, or a
>
> totally linear bottom, but their freedom and creativity seems to be the
>
> product of a classical computer emerging from those quantum (or FPPI)
>
> computations. FPPI = first person plural indeterminacy computations).
>
> Best,
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
>
> Principal, High Performance Coders
>
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
>
> University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>
> Groups
>
> "Everything List" group.
>
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>
> an
>
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>
> Visit this group at
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>
> Groups
>
> "Everything List" group.
>
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>
> an
>
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>
> Visit this group at
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>
> "Everything List" group.
>
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>
> "Everything List" group.
>
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>
> "Everything List" group.
>
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to