2013/9/3 meekerdb <[email protected]> > On 9/3/2013 6:14 AM, [email protected] wrote: > >> Yes, that's also my favorite way of thinking about this, you are >> precisely that what you experience at any one time, and that may well >> include memories of the past. >> >> What was discussed earlier in this thread about decoherence, is only >> revelevant to explaining why you don't get macroscopic manifestations of >> typical quantum phenomena like interference phenomena or violations of >> certain Bell's inequalities if you take serious that there are multiple >> histories instead of a single unique one. >> >> What happens is that you get decoherent histories that effectively don't >> interfere with each other. So, we can safely say that Obama winning the >> elections was not due to macroscopically different histories leading to >> destructive interference in Romney's vote count in Ohio. >> >> What one cannot say is that decoherence somehow leads to a single history >> being selected (unless you a priori asume a collapse theory). What you get >> is a set of macroscopically distinct histories that are decoherent relative >> to each other, but with sufficient lack of knowledge you can be in many of >> them simultaneously. >> > > That's where this account gets muddled. Who lacks knowledge? There is no > "you".
There is, the one experiencing things here and now. > > This effect will not lead to probabilities behaving in a different way >> than what you would get from classical probability theory assuming that the >> uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge and that in reality only ione >> history really exists. >> > > The very concept of probabilities implies there is some "you" that > experiences them. We don't experience the past, we remember it here and now, the only experience an experiencer has is the here and now. > > >> So, you then can't see the difference between all these histories >> copatible with your knowledge really existing and that they don't exist. >> But that's not a good argument (by itself) to say that they in fact don't >> exist. >> > > But if there are "all these histories" then there is no "you". > There is, the one experiencing things here and now. Quentin > > Brent > > > >> Saibal >> >> >> Citeren Dennis Ochei <[email protected]>: >> >> Given that we are elements that might belong to multiple sequences, there >>> is no fact of the matter as to which sequence we belong to. >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:23 AM, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]>* >>> *wrote: >>> >>> Yes, exactly. >>>> >>>> > But then there are no "experiencers"... >>>> >>>> I prefer to say that experiencers are their experiences than to say >>>> there >>>> are no experiencers (I'm explaining my phrasing more than anything) >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 11:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> You mean experiences are purely qualitative, so there cannot be two >>>>> identical experiences rather, if identical they must be one (by >>>>> Leibniz's >>>>> identity of indiscernibles) and not two. But then there are no >>>>> "experiencers", only sequences of experiences which may have some >>>>> unifying >>>>> property and which may share elements with other sequences. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 9/2/2013 8:55 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: >>>>> >>>>> "Qualitatively identical experiencers are also numerically identical" >>>>> is >>>>> how i sum this position up >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, August 14, 2013 4:39:27 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 8/14/2013 7:48 AM, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> > Citeren Russell Standish <[email protected]>: >>>>>> > >>>>>> >> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 05:26:41PM -0700, Pierz wrote: >>>>>> >>> I need clarification of the significance of quantum theory to >>>>>> determining >>>>>> >>> the *past*. I remember having read or heard that the past itself >>>>>> is >>>>>> subject >>>>>> >>> to quantum uncertainty. Something like the idea that the past is >>>>>> determined >>>>>> >>> only to to the extent that it is forced to be so by the state of >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>> present, if that makes sense. In other words, there may be more >>>>>> than >>>>>> one >>>>>> >>> history that could lead to the current state of the world. Let's >>>>>> say >>>>>> it >>>>>> >>> might have been one way or another and then we make a measurement >>>>>> which >>>>>> >>> resolves this question, we are 'forcing' the past to be one way or >>>>>> another. >>>>>> >>> In MWI, that would be saying my 'track' through the multiverse is >>>>>> ambiguous >>>>>> >>> in both directions, both into the future and 'behind me' so to >>>>>> speak. I'm >>>>>> >>> unclear on this and what it precisely means. I seem to recall that >>>>>> it was >>>>>> >>> critical in calculations Hawking made about the early universe - >>>>>> at >>>>>> a >>>>>> >>> certain point these uncertainties became critical and it meant >>>>>> that >>>>>> it was >>>>>> >>> no longer possible to say that the universe had definitely been >>>>>> one >>>>>> way or >>>>>> >>> another. Can someone clarify this for me? >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> This idea of the past not being determinate until such a time as a >>>>>> >> measurement in the present forces the issue is fundamental to my >>>>>> >> interpretation of QM. It is also related to the Quantum Eraser. >>>>>> Saibal >>>>>> >> Mitra has written some stuff on this too - maybe he'd like to >>>>>> comment? >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> On the other hand, I don't think this view is particularly >>>>>> >> mainstream. Even many worlds people tend to think that the >>>>>> multiverse >>>>>> >> has decohered in the past, and that there is a matter of fact which >>>>>> >> branch we are in, even if we're ignorant of that fact. >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> I can't comment on Hawking's work, unfortunately, as I'm not aware >>>>>> of >>>>>> that. >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> Cheers >>>>>> >> -- >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Yes, I would agree with the view taken by Russell here. It has >>>>>> interesting consequences >>>>>> > for any future artificial intelligence who can reset its memory, as >>>>>> I >>>>>> explain here: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825 >>>>>> > >>>>>> > So, if you reset your memory at random with some probability p and >>>>>> you >>>>>> also do that in >>>>>> > case of an impending disaster, then if you find yourself in a state >>>>>> where you know that >>>>>> > your memory has been reset and you need to reload your memory, the >>>>>> reason why the memory >>>>>> > has been reset (routine random memory reset or you were facing an >>>>>> impending disaster), >>>>>> > is no longer determined, you are identical in the different branches >>>>>> until you find out >>>>>> > the reason. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > So, while you are firmly in the classical regime and therefore you >>>>>> won't see any changes >>>>>> > in the probabilities of the outcomes of these sorts of experiments >>>>>> relative to what you >>>>>> > would expect classically, the interpretation of how these >>>>>> probabilities arise is >>>>>> > different; while it is worthwhile to do these memory resettings in a >>>>>> "single classical >>>>>> > world" it wouldn't be worthwhile. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > The article I wrote (it was just an essay for FQXI competition which >>>>>> got the attention >>>>>> > from New Scientist), is actually rather simple, it treats the >>>>>> problem >>>>>> in a >>>>>> > non-relativistic way, which is a bit unnatural (the times at which >>>>>> things happen in the >>>>>> > different different branches seems to matter). You can easily >>>>>> generalize this, also you >>>>>> > can consider thought experiments involving false memories that may >>>>>> be >>>>>> correct memories >>>>>> > in different branches etc. etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hmm. It seems that "erasing your memory" would encompass a lot more >>>>>> than what is commonly >>>>>> referred to as memory. Quantum erasure requires erasing all the >>>>>> information that is >>>>>> diffused into the environment. So erasing one's memory would imply >>>>>> quantum erasure of all >>>>>> the information about your past - not just the infinitesimal bit that >>>>>> you can consciously >>>>>> recall. >>>>>> >>>>>> Brent >>>>>> >>>>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to > everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> > . > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> > . > For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > . > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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