On 29 Sep 2013, at 19:38, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> And "cause" is a complex high level notion.
A cause is complex and at a high level only if the effect is complex
and at a high level. If Z is at the fundamental level (assuming
there really is such a level and causes and effects aren't
infinitely nested) then it's quite literally the simplest thing in
the world to say that Y causes Z, because after that there is
nothing more to say.
? (too much fuzzy talk for me).
> > Does "comp" mean every event must have a cause?
Then I do believe in "comp".
It is an open problem.
> with comp every event has a reason
Then I do NOT believe in "comp". And this is why I say I don't know
what "comp" means and neither do you.
An arithmetical reason. Of course you can argue that 0 exists for no
reason. I prefer not doing philosophy, before you grasp the FPI, or
find a flaw.
> but not necessarily a "physical cause".
Ignoring the fact that you have never satisfactorily explained what
This is a gratuitous unfair remark. I am probably the first one who
give a precise definition of the "physical" and which does not assumed
any physical reality of any sort. But to grasp this, you need to
progress a little bit more in the work.
even in pure mathematics your ideas break down. Chaitin's constant
is completely random,
In some sense; yes. It is also entirely determined ("God can know it").
it has no physical cause, it has no non physical cause,
(I prefer to avoid the notion of "cause", but it is obvious that
Chaitin number as a cause or logical reason).
and Chaitin proved that no logical process, no function, no infinite
sequence, nothing, can produce it.
It is limit computable, you can approximate it from below, (without
ever knowing when the decimal stabilize, but they will). You can also
compute it from an oracle for the Busy beaver function.
You mix math and physics in a context which does not assumed physics.
Nobody knows or will ever know the value of Chaitin's constant, all
we know is that it exists and it's a real number greater than 0 but
less than 1.
I have computed it with many decimal for some universal system. If the
universal formalism makes little program easily not stopping (or
stopping) you can compute the first decimal.
In fact most real numbers are like that, unlike very rare exceptions
like the rational numbers or PI or e the shortest way to express
most real numbers is to just write down all the digits. There is no
Sure. That is why you can use the iterated self-duplication to grasp
that the FPI lead to a very strong form of indeterminacy.
>> Thus regardless of what "comp" means it is certain that if
Everett is correct then Bruno Marchal has more than one future;
> In God' eyes, or in the 3p view, but the 1p-view remains unique.
Tell me more about this unique 1p-view; if you mean the view of
Helsinki the man is having right now then the "1p-view" will never
see Washington or Moscow or anything else except the view of
Helsinki as it is right now.
It the comp equivalent of Everett"s impossiblity to feel the split. In
helsinki you know that whoever you will note in the local personal
diary, it will contain only "I see W" or "I see M". It is in that
sense that the 1-view remain unique, from its 1-view perspective.
> the question is about what you (in Helsinki) can expect to feel.
NO!! That is NOT the question
I am the one asking the question. That remark is definitely absurd.
and this is the single most important thing you're so dreadfully
confused about. You want to know about the nature of personal
Absolutely not. I want only evaluate my chance to see M, or W, when in
helsinki I am told that I will be duplicated. I know that I will push
on a button, open a door and see a city, and by comp I know I will see
only one city (indeoendetly of any concern on personal identity, and
the reasoning works for any machine, or even just any duplicable
You keep asserting an repeating statement that I have already
addressed and explain how much you are not correct on what I said or
and for that it is 100% irrelevant if your expectations turn out to
be correct or not. All that matters is if tomorrow there is a person
(or lots of persons, it doesn't matter) who remembers being you today.
Which is trivially the case in our case.
Since I was a child my expectations have proven to be incorrect many
many times, yet I have always felt like me.
Personal identity is addressed in another paper I wrote, but the UDA
does not rely to it (it is the contrary: the theory of personal
identity relies on the UDA, and this is completely out of the present
Here, personal identity is only distracting.
> In all case, he will feel to be a unique person having been
selected for one future relatively to who he remembers to be (the
guy in Helsinki).
And because there are several different people who all remember
being the guy in Helsinki it turned out that the guy in Helsinki had
several different futures.
From some 3p view, that's correct. But the question is about the most
probable first person experience, and they are all unique from their 1-
However the "1p-view of Helsinki right now" no longer exists for
anyone because "right now" is different.
But, as you just said yourself, the point is that the copies both
remember their "Helsinki experience", and presently see only W or only
M, and so can understand that the correct prediction was "W or M".
But no doubt I am confusing the first person view of the second
person view of the third person view with the second person view of
the first person view of the third person view once removed on my
> You just continue to ignore the 1p and 3p distinction.
And I will take that into account just as soon as you figure out
what the hell that distinction is.
The 1-view = the content of the diary taken by the experiencer in the
The 3-vieW = the content of the diary of some observer looking at the
experience, but not entering in the teleportation box.
It is written and explained in the sane2004 paper, and I feel like
having recall it very often, so ... I am not sure you try to
understand. You already understood, and when I asked you why you don't
go to the step 4, you told me "I don't know".
So, I still have no clue what is your problem.
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