# Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 29 Sep 2013, at 19:38, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> And "cause" is a complex high level notion.

A cause is complex and at a high level only if the effect is complex and at a high level. If Z is at the fundamental level (assuming there really is such a level and causes and effects aren't infinitely nested) then it's quite literally the simplest thing in the world to say that Y causes Z, because after that there is nothing more to say.

? (too much fuzzy talk for me).

> > Does "comp" mean every event must have a cause?

> No.

Then I do believe in "comp".

It is an open problem.

> with comp every event has a reason

Then I do NOT believe in "comp". And this is why I say I don't know what "comp" means and neither do you.

An arithmetical reason. Of course you can argue that 0 exists for no reason. I prefer not doing philosophy, before you grasp the FPI, or find a flaw.

> but not necessarily a "physical cause".

Ignoring the fact that you have never satisfactorily explained what "physical" means,

This is a gratuitous unfair remark. I am probably the first one who give a precise definition of the "physical" and which does not assumed any physical reality of any sort. But to grasp this, you need to progress a little bit more in the work.

even in pure mathematics your ideas break down. Chaitin's constant is completely random,

In some sense; yes. It is also entirely determined ("God can know it").

it has no physical cause, it has no non physical cause,

?
(I prefer to avoid the notion of "cause", but it is obvious that Chaitin number as a cause or logical reason).

and Chaitin proved that no logical process, no function, no infinite sequence, nothing, can produce it.

It is limit computable, you can approximate it from below, (without ever knowing when the decimal stabilize, but they will). You can also compute it from an oracle for the Busy beaver function.

You mix math and physics in a context which does not assumed physics.

Nobody knows or will ever know the value of Chaitin's constant, all we know is that it exists and it's a real number greater than 0 but less than 1.

I have computed it with many decimal for some universal system. If the universal formalism makes little program easily not stopping (or stopping) you can compute the first decimal.

In fact most real numbers are like that, unlike very rare exceptions like the rational numbers or PI or e the shortest way to express most real numbers is to just write down all the digits. There is no shortcut.

Sure. That is why you can use the iterated self-duplication to grasp that the FPI lead to a very strong form of indeterminacy.

>> Thus regardless of what "comp" means it is certain that if Everett is correct then Bruno Marchal has more than one future;

> In God' eyes, or in the 3p view, but the 1p-view remains unique.

Tell me more about this unique 1p-view; if you mean the view of Helsinki the man is having right now then the "1p-view" will never see Washington or Moscow or anything else except the view of Helsinki as it is right now.

It the comp equivalent of Everett"s impossiblity to feel the split. In helsinki you know that whoever you will note in the local personal diary, it will contain only "I see W" or "I see M". It is in that sense that the 1-view remain unique, from its 1-view perspective.

> the question is about what you (in Helsinki) can expect to feel.

NO!! That is NOT the question

I am the one asking the question.  That remark is definitely absurd.

and this is the single most important thing you're so dreadfully confused about. You want to know about the nature of personal identity,

Absolutely not. I want only evaluate my chance to see M, or W, when in helsinki I am told that I will be duplicated. I know that I will push on a button, open a door and see a city, and by comp I know I will see only one city (indeoendetly of any concern on personal identity, and the reasoning works for any machine, or even just any duplicable entity).

You keep asserting an repeating statement that I have already addressed and explain how much you are not correct on what I said or wrote.

and for that it is 100% irrelevant if your expectations turn out to be correct or not. All that matters is if tomorrow there is a person (or lots of persons, it doesn't matter) who remembers being you today.

Which is trivially the case in our case.

Since I was a child my expectations have proven to be incorrect many many times, yet I have always felt like me.

Personal identity is addressed in another paper I wrote, but the UDA does not rely to it (it is the contrary: the theory of personal identity relies on the UDA, and this is completely out of the present topic).

Here, personal identity is only distracting.

> In all case, he will feel to be a unique person having been selected for one future relatively to who he remembers to be (the guy in Helsinki).

And because there are several different people who all remember being the guy in Helsinki it turned out that the guy in Helsinki had several different futures.

From some 3p view, that's correct. But the question is about the most probable first person experience, and they are all unique from their 1- pov view.

However the "1p-view of Helsinki right now" no longer exists for anyone because "right now" is different.

But, as you just said yourself, the point is that the copies both remember their "Helsinki experience", and presently see only W or only M, and so can understand that the correct prediction was "W or M".

But no doubt I am confusing the first person view of the second person view of the third person view with the second person view of the first person view of the third person view once removed on my mother's side.

> You just continue to ignore the 1p and 3p distinction.

And I will take that into account just as soon as you figure out what the hell that distinction is.

The 1-view = the content of the diary taken by the experiencer in the teleportation box(es) The 3-vieW = the content of the diary of some observer looking at the experience, but not entering in the teleportation box.

It is written and explained in the sane2004 paper, and I feel like having recall it very often, so ... I am not sure you try to understand. You already understood, and when I asked you why you don't go to the step 4, you told me "I don't know".

So, I still have no clue what is your problem.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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