# Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

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On 01 Oct 2013, at 08:30, chris peck wrote:```
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```Hi Liz

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>> The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each outcome, even though he knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and that in reality "he will see both" .... But there seems to be a lot of trouble with the comp version for some reason.
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Bruno has a meeting in washington but has double booked it with one in moscow. So, he goes to the teleporter/duplicator and travels off to both cities and both meetings. On the way back both Brunos take the Re-assembler, which, when both scans are available, runs a quick 'diff' over them and merges the result back into one. Bruno is reassembled replete with memories of both trips.
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We ask this Bruno what the probability was of experiencing Moscow before the trip. Well he has a 1-p memory of both cities, so he knows, from a 1-p view that the chance was 1.
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On the contrary, B will remember having ask himself "why Washington" in Washington, and "why Moscow" in Moscow. He will remember having be undetermined. The fusion of memories (accepting they made sense without erasing the W and M exoerience (which is not clear for me) will confirm even more the indeterminacy (if possible).
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I imagine there will be some sort of ad hoc 'no cul-de-sac' strap ons to Bruno's theory as to why this kind of experiment is barred. But it seems perfectly in tune with 'comp' to me. What I think it shows is that the probabilities depend on how many Bruno's there are when the question is asked.
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The question is asked in Helsinki, and concerns the city seen after (immediately after if you prefer) pushing the button.
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And if you ask before teleportation the probability is 1 as it is after the merge.
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That is logically impossible, as it would need to live simultaneously being in both cities, which is impossible in the protocol given.
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The probabilities are governed by conjunction when you ask one man about to be duplicated: he will be in moscow AND washington. When you ask a duplicate, he IS in moscow OR washington. 1-p ness, 3- pness, 10p-ness, its all philosophical sleight of hand as far as I can tell.
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No, it concerns the result of self-localization written in the personal diary directly after the duplication. That is third person verifiable (objective, testable). Your argument would admit an equivalent one for negating the quantum indeterminacy that we live, and which is explained in the deterministic account of QM-Everett.
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tell me if you see the point. Some people need the iterated self- duplication to get the aha, so I don't despair that you see the point (unless you don't want to see it, of course). Have you read the sane2004 paper? What about step 4?
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Bruno

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And if I am pre-duplicate, being asked what I expect, if I believe in comp then I will expect to be in moscow and washington. Afterall, believing in comp I would not believe that there would be some other thing that chased my description to either city. Beliefs and expectancies are 1-p phenomena. What else is there? There is only me trying to imagine being either washington-me or Moscow-me in the future. But this is a 3-p perspective. As soon as I imagine me being somewhere else, I am objectifying me. Im 3-peeing me.
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regards

Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 12:32:06 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com

On 1 October 2013 09:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

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Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a 100% probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember being the Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that the Helsinki man had more than one future.
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Nicely and succinctly put. In comp the "duplicated man" indeed has more than one future.
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Bruno is distinguishing between our "overview" and the man's personal point of view, and ISTM that this is analogous to a scientist performing a schrodinger's cat type experiment. The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each outcome, even though he knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and that in reality "he will see both" (i.e. he has more than one future). Similarly the guy in Helsinki assigns a 50% chance to "himself" arriving in Washington, and ditto for Moscow. But from our "third person" perspective, he arrives in both places. I can't see that this is problematic, if we accept the MWI then the comp thought experiment is very similar. But there seems to be a lot of trouble with the comp version for some reason.
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