# RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

```Hi Liz

>> The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each outcome, even though he
>> knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and that in reality "he will
>> see both" ....  But there seems to be a lot of trouble with the comp version
>> for some reason.```
```
Bruno has a meeting in washington but has double booked it with one in moscow.
So, he goes to the teleporter/duplicator and travels off to both cities and
both meetings. On the way back both Brunos take the Re-assembler, which,  when
both scans are available, runs a quick 'diff' over them and merges the result
back into one. Bruno is reassembled replete with memories of both trips.

We ask this Bruno what the probability was of experiencing Moscow before the
trip. Well he has a 1-p memory of both cities, so he knows, from a 1-p view
that the chance was 1.

I imagine there will be some sort of ad hoc 'no cul-de-sac' strap ons to
Bruno's theory as to why this kind of experiment is barred. But it seems
perfectly in tune with 'comp' to me. What I think it shows is that the
probabilities depend on how many Bruno's there are when the question is asked.
And if you ask before teleportation the probability is 1 as it is after the
merge.

The probabilities are governed by conjunction when you ask one man about to be
duplicated: he will be in moscow AND washington. When you ask a duplicate, he
IS in moscow OR washington. 1-p ness, 3-pness, 10p-ness, its all philosophical
sleight of hand as far as I can tell.

And if I am pre-duplicate, being asked what I expect, if I believe in comp then
I will expect to be in moscow and washington. Afterall, believing in comp I
would not believe that there would be some other thing that chased my
description to either city. Beliefs and expectancies are 1-p phenomena. What
else is there? There is only me trying to imagine being either washington-me or
Moscow-me in the future. But this is a 3-p perspective. As soon as I imagine me
being somewhere else, I am objectifying me. Im 3-peeing me.

regards

Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 12:32:06 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com

On 1 October 2013 09:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a 100%
probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember being the
Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that the Helsinki man had
more than one future.

Nicely and succinctly put. In comp the "duplicated man" indeed has more than
one future.

Bruno is distinguishing between our "overview" and the man's personal point of
view, and ISTM that this is analogous to a scientist performing a schrodinger's
cat type experiment. The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each
outcome, even though he knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and
that in reality "he will see both" (i.e. he has more than one future).
Similarly the guy in Helsinki assigns a 50% chance to "himself" arriving in
Washington, and ditto for Moscow. But from our "third person" perspective, he
arrives in both places. I can't see that this is problematic, if we accept the
MWI then the comp thought experiment is very similar. But there seems to be a
lot of trouble with the comp version for some reason.

--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.