On 30 September 2013 16:56, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > I think it's just definitional. What constitutes "you". If you see > someone else throw dice and you're bound to follow different actions > depending on how they fall then you're a slave to randomness. If you > decide to throw the dice in order to determine your course of action then > it's an act of will. Now suppose something random in your head, like decay > of a radioactive iodine atom, causes a certain thought that leads to you > choosing vanilla instead of chocolate ice cream. Did you choose or were you > "a slave to randomness"? And note that in this kind of example the > randomness doesn't make you do just anything. It can only work within the > range of your deterministic self. It won't make you choose liver ice cream > or jump off a bridge. We make the distinction in ordinary discourse: We > say someone isn't acting himself when they do something wildly inconsistent > with their past behavior. We send them to a psychiatrist. > > So equally, if I threw the dice in secret to decide what to do (having decided by "an act of will" what the results mean before I do so) that would give the same result as if they happened to be inside me.
As you say this seems purely definitional. I can't see any greater or lesser amount of being "a slave to randomness" however you do it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
