On 30 Sep 2013, at 06:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2013 9:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 16:56, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I think it's just definitional. What constitutes "you". If you
see someone else throw dice and you're bound to follow different
actions depending on how they fall then you're a slave to
randomness. If you decide to throw the dice in order to determine
your course of action then it's an act of will. Now suppose
something random in your head, like decay of a radioactive iodine
atom, causes a certain thought that leads to you choosing vanilla
instead of chocolate ice cream. Did you choose or were you "a slave
to randomness"? And note that in this kind of example the
randomness doesn't make you do just anything. It can only work
within the range of your deterministic self. It won't make you
choose liver ice cream or jump off a bridge. We make the
distinction in ordinary discourse: We say someone isn't acting
himself when they do something wildly inconsistent with their past
behavior. We send them to a psychiatrist.
So equally, if I threw the dice in secret to decide what to do
(having decided by "an act of will" what the results mean before I
do so) that would give the same result as if they happened to be
inside me.
As you say this seems purely definitional. I can't see any greater
or lesser amount of being "a slave to randomness" however you do it.
The greater or lesser enslavement is in the range of decisions made
at random. Your decisions should serve to realize your values. If
you deliberately make decisions contrary or indifferent to your
values that's being irrational; it's not serving yourself. That's
where the metaphor of being a slave to randomness comes in. I don't
think it depends on where the dice are thrown (though if it's in
your head you won't even know). Being a slave means serving someone
else. If you make a random choice to serve your interest that's not
being a slave. If you, thru coercion or stupidity, say, "I'm going
to throw a dart at the financial page and invest in whatever stock
it lands on, even if I think this is a bad idea." THEN you're a
slave to randomness.
I think there is a psychological component to the idea that choosing
at random can't be "free will" because we think of "will" as being a
kind of mental effort, a mustering of resolve. Someone is "strong
willed" when they expend a lot of effort to get what they want. So
those cases where making a random choice is in our interest seem not
to require this kind of will.
OK with the above.
Incidentally, on another list I was just sent a paper by Taner Edis
on how randomness allows one to evade Penrose's argument that
consciousness cannot be algorithmic.
To use randomness to evade an invalid argument seems to me doubtful at
the start.
But consciousness is not algorithmic, like the truth that 1+1 = 2, is
not really algorithmic (only the belief can be algorithmic).
Computer science shows that most interesting notions *about* machines,
are not mechanical or algorithmic.
Bruno
See attached.
Brent
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<Edisgoedel.pdf>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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