On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:20 PM, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Quentin
>
>
>>> Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
>>> accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
>>> duplication experience.
>
> But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken
> very seriously by Everetians and their critics.
>
> In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine
> chance, because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I
> suspect, be similar in that regard.
>
> So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated
> with one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense
> at all.
>
> It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in
> MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no
> equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be
> duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I
> will survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there
> is not two of me yet ...
>
> But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard
> Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

I propose that the main insight that is necessary here is that, when
there is some split (quantum choice, duplication machine, whatever),
_both_ copies are conscious and _both_ feel that they are a real
continuation of the original. But looking at it from the first person,
each copy has no way of accessing the point of view of the other copy.
Uncertainty arises from the lack of information that each first person
perspective has about the entire picture. This, in fact, explains
probabilities in a more convincing way than the more conventional
models, because in more conventional models you have to live with this
weird idea of "randomness" that seems to defy explanation.

So when you make a statement about the probability of something
happening, you are always making a statement about a possible
continuation of your first person experience and nothing more. In
fact, "happening" becomes an entirely 1p concept. This does not prove
anything but it does fit what we observe without the need for a
mysterious property called "randomness".

You don't have to be suicidal to say yes to the doctor because what
the doctor is going to do to you happens all the time anyway.

I think.

Telmo.

> ________________________________
> From: allco...@gmail.com
> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
>
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
>
> 2013/10/7 chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>
>
> Hi Bruno
>
>
>>> Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say "no"
>>> to the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?
>
> I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing
> Moscow (or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.
>
> regards
>
>
>
> It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a
> next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after
> duplication, both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability
> expectation before duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as
> probability in MWI setting... it's the same.
>
> Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you
> accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp
> duplication experience.
>
> Quentin
>
>
>
>
> ________________________________
> From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
>
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200
>
>
>
> On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:
>
> On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
>
>
> The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are
> not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.
>
>
> This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.
>
>
> Thanks for noticing.
>
>
> If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least)
> then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
> same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the
> point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a
> computation,
>
>
> Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a
> computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is
> simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and
> get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at
> some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with
> pick-nickers)
>
>
> and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence
> constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be
> duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a
> computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy,
> or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in
> principle. Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?)
>
> Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless.
> The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation,
>
>
> In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p
> notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:
> G* proves (Bp & p) <-> Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about
> herself.
>
> That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that "my
> consciousness" is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.
>
>
> a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?
>
>
> I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical
> possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.
> Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is
> phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear
> why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post,
> like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to
> proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop),
> or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't
> know what John Clark is thinking.
>
>
> (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is
> apparently doing it constantly.)
>
>
> Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical
> reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.
> People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very
> rare. I know only one: Clark.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
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