Quentin

>> Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you 
>> accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
>> duplication experience.

But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very 
seriously by Everetians and their critics.

In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, 
because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be 
similar in that regard.

So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with 
one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all.

It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in 
MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no 
equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be 
duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will 
survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not 
two of me yet ...

But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard 
Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2013/10/7 chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>






Hi Bruno

>> Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say "no" to 
>> the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.




regards


It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a 
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, 
both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before 
duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... 
it's the same.




Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept 
them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
duplication experience.

Quentin



 


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be



To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:



 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:



 
 > The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
 


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 



Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 



Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 




and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?)



 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:


G* proves (Bp & p) <-> Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about 
herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that "my 
consciousness" is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.




a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.


Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is 
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear 
why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, 
like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to 
proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or 
that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know 
what John Clark is thinking.




(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is 
apparently doing it constantly.)

Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical 
reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.


People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very 
rare. I know only one: Clark.
Bruno


 


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 





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