On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one (a case
where
Leibniz identity rule fails,
If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it most certainly has NOT
failed.
I was talking on the rule:
a = b
a = c
entails that b = c
The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will not remember having
been the W-guy, and reciprocally).
The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and which, btw, can be
done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many people showed to you. Each time we talk
about the prediction the "he" refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or of both, and look at
their individual confirmation or refutation of their prediction done in Helsinki. We
just look at diaries, and I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't
try to understand.
There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of the most easy part of
the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not interested in
learning.
Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the indeterminancy is to be
interpreted as a probability. There's some good discussion here,
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.
Brent
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