Hi John,
Bruno, I tried to control my mouse for a long time....
The M guy is NOT the Y guy, when he remembers having been the Y guy.
Who is the Y guy? I guess you mean the guy in Helsinki.
Yes, you said it many times, but NOW again! Has this list no
consequential resolution?
Some people seem to have inexhaustible patience!
"It" was in the past and in the meantime lots happened to 'M"
Not with the protocol in step 3. You just push on a button, and you
are read, annihilated, and reconstituted in two places (W and M) in
the state which has just been scanned in Helsinki.
Some times go by, but not a lot, and the question is about what you
will live. With comp, it is clear that you will live in W OR in M, but
that any more precise prediction will fail.
that probably did (not? or quite differently?) happen to 'Y' and you
are not that youngster who went to school, no matter how identical
you 'feel' to be.
That argument (taking thousands times more on this list than it
deserves) is false:
it leaves out the CHANGING of the world we LIVE IN (considered
usually as time???)
Then both the probability used in the throwing on a coin, or in QM, in
fact all use of prediction become useless. You argument condemns the
whole field of statistics and probability. If the whether broadcast
says that if will rain at the end of the day, you might say that is
nonsense, as we will be all dead before.
So I try to stay in the reality where 'panta rhei'.
I can see that 'panta rhei', because I stay myself enough in the
process.
...and I am not identical to the guy I WAS. (Some accused people use
such arguments as well in court, but that is another table.)
The question is not about identity, but about predicting some
happenings to first person view. With your argument I cannot believe
that I will drink a cup of coffee when I am preparing it.
In fact your argument would entail that the probability is zero to
survive with an artificial brain, so you are assuming non-comp. No
problem with that, but my goal is the study of the consequence of comp.
Bruno
On Mon, Oct 7, 2013 at 3:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 19:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/6/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]> wrote:
> you have agreed that all "bruno marchal" are the original one
(a case where Leibniz identity rule fails,
If you're talking about Leibniz Identity of indiscernibles it
most certainly has NOT failed.
I was talking on the rule:
a = b
a = c
entails that b = c
The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
The W-guy is the H-guy (the W-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
But the M-guy is not the W-guy (in the sense that the M-guy will
not remember having been the W-guy, and reciprocally).
The rest are unconvincing rhetorical tricks, already answered, and
which, btw, can be done for the quantum indeterminacy, as many
people showed to you. Each time we talk about the prediction the
"he" refer to the guy in Helsinki before the duplication, after
the duplication, we mention if we talk of the guy in M or in W, or
of both, and look at their individual confirmation or refutation
of their prediction done in Helsinki. We just look at diaries, and
I have made those things clear, but you talk like if you don't try
to understand.
There is nothing controversial, and you fake misunderstanding of
the most easy part of the reasoning.
Not sure what is your agenda, but it is clear that you are not
interested in learning.
Well there is still *some* controversy; mainly about how the
indeterminancy is to be interpreted as a probability. There's some
good discussion here, http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret
especially the last comment by Ron Maimon.
I was talking on the arithmetical FPI, or even just the local
probability for duplication protocol. This has nothing to do with
QM, except when using the MWI as a confirmation of the mùany dreams.
Having said that I don't agree with the preferred base problem. That
problem comes from the fact that our computations can make sense
only in the base where we have evolved abilities to make some
distinction. The difficulty is for physicists believing in worlds,
but there are only knowledge states of observer/dreamers.
But I insist, here, what I said was not controversial is that in the
WM duplication thought experience, *with the precise protocol
given*, we have an indeterminacy, indeed even a P = 1/2 situation.
The quantum case is notoriously more difficult (due indeed to the
lack of definition of "world"), but it seems to me that Everett use
both Gleason theorem + a sort of FPI (more or less implicitly).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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