Why is there such a huge argument about this duplication chamber business? It seems to be not getting anywhere. Could you perhaps go back to the original statement of step 3 and use that to point out what is wrong?
>From memory step 3 was - Helsinki man is teleported to both Washington and Moscow. From his perspective, what is his chance of arriving in Moscow (or Washington) ? This strikes me as analogous to Schrodinger's Cat. The experimenter asks what is the chance that he will see a live cat? He is talking in a folk sense I suppose, because in reality he will split into two people and see both. But like Moscow man, after the split it will seem as though he had a 50-50 chance of seeing either, so there is at least a sense of "1p indeterminacy" which is clealy, to anyone else "3p certainty" - that he will see both a live and a dead cat, or that H-man will see both W and M. This is just Everett's explanation for quantum indeterminacy applied to a mind, assumed to be duplicable (as comp assumes it is "just" the current state of an ongoing computation). Seems fairly straightforward to me, is there a problem with any of that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
