Why is there such a huge argument about this duplication chamber business? It seems to be not getting anywhere. Could you perhaps go back to the original statement of step 3 and use that to point out what is wrong?
>From memory step 3 was - Helsinki man is teleported to both Washington and Moscow. From his perspective, what is his chance of arriving in Moscow (or Washington) ? This strikes me as analogous to Schrodinger's Cat. The experimenter asks what is the chance that he will see a live cat? He is talking in a folk sense I suppose, because in reality he will split into two people and see both. But like Moscow man, after the split it will seem as though he had a 50-50 chance of seeing either, so there is at least a sense of "1p indeterminacy" which is clealy, to anyone else "3p certainty" - that he will see both a live and a dead cat, or that H-man will see both W and M. This is just Everett's explanation for quantum indeterminacy applied to a mind, assumed to be duplicable (as comp assumes it is "just" the current state of an ongoing computation). Seems fairly straightforward to me, is there a problem with any of that? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.