Why is there such a huge argument about this duplication chamber business?
It seems to be not getting anywhere. Could you perhaps go back to the
original statement of step 3 and use that to point out what is wrong?
>From memory step 3 was - Helsinki man is teleported to both Washington and
Moscow. From his perspective, what is his chance of arriving in Moscow (or
This strikes me as analogous to Schrodinger's Cat. The experimenter asks
what is the chance that he will see a live cat? He is talking in a folk
sense I suppose, because in reality he will split into two people and see
both. But like Moscow man, after the split it will seem as though he had a
50-50 chance of seeing either, so there is at least a sense of "1p
indeterminacy" which is clealy, to anyone else "3p certainty" - that he
will see both a live and a dead cat, or that H-man will see both W and M.
This is just Everett's explanation for quantum indeterminacy applied to a
mind, assumed to be duplicable (as comp assumes it is "just" the current
state of an ongoing computation).
Seems fairly straightforward to me, is there a problem with any of that?
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