Hi Brent >> This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is >> correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this >> is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person >> even from one second to the next.
I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things remain the same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't flow. Or the human body has an underlying form and structure that gets maintained as the constituent matter comes and goes. It is the abstract relationship between elements that constitutes identity rather than the elements themselves. I would think this reading of Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a neo-patonist. I would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he would really be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural numbers from which 'shadows of us' are derived. In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in comp. This is the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he violates in step 3. >> I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a >> probability. Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he explicitly assigns probability: "This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” All the best Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700 From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote: On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > The M-guy is the H-guy (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy) The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday. This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?) JC should read this: http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a probability. Brent Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.) -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
