On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:

    On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
    <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

        > The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

    The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not
    identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?)


JC should read this: http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a 
probability.

Brent

Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)

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