On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:

On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)

The H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times.

Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a computation,

Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers)

and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. Or is "in principle" itself objectionable?)

Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation,

In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God: G* proves (Bp & p) <-> Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself.

That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that "my consciousness" is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.

a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility?

I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy. Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking.

(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is apparently doing it constantly.)

Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers. People accepting the consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: Clark.



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