On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 8:14 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 13, 2013 at 6:58 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 4:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > wrote: > > > >> if you agree that each copy (the W-man, and the M-man) get one bit of > >> information, > > > > > > I agree that if that one bit of information that they both see is not > > identical then the 2 men are no longer identical either and it becomes > > justified to give them different names. > > Ok, so you then also have to agree that John Clark 1 second ago is not > identical to John Clark 2 seconds ago. But things would get a bit > confusing if I started calling you Mary Sue now. > > Both you and external observers agree that you are still John Clark. > > Either you claim that teleportation is fundamentally different from > time passing in generating new John Clarks, or you don't. Which one is > it? > I'll give it a shot, but I could well be confusing things/levels: Does that question make sense given complete arithmetization of self-reference by Gödel (and whoever else did this or contributed) when we assume comp? Because new and old John Clarks cannot be distinguished as we can't distinguish between "particular" machines and copies. This is related to the confusion recently on first person and third person.The reasoning concerns 3p formalizable discourse of self-reference of sufficiently rich machines. So the third person "I". However, a particular copy (?) machine making self-referential statements from 3rd person point of view, will communicate an account of some version of its states, and so talking histories of Moscow etc. at this level, when one copy of a machine is concerned in the thought experiment, is valid. But as Moscow etc. is not part of formal self-reference provability, Gödel does not arithmetize this knowledge of 1st person bit and I think incompleteness refutes that we can because []p -> p would hold. That's how I make sense or nonsense out of it anyway. PGC > I suspect you think they are the same, but I also predict an attempt > to avoid answering the question directly, possibly combined with > comparing me to a baboon with below-average IQ and early onset > dementia. > > > > >> > then you agree with the first person indeterminacy. > > > > > > I agree that life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're > > going to see next. Forrest Gump had that figured out a long time ago. > > > > > >>> >> As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling > >>> >> of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, > or any > >>> >> other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does > it > >>> >> matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute. > >> > >> > >> > ? (as far as I can make sense of this sentence, it looks like it makes > >> > my point) > > > > > > I'm very glad to hear that. But what was your point? > > > > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
