On 12 Oct 2013, at 09:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, October 11, 2013 11:32:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Saturday, October 12, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, October 11, 2013 5:37:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Oct 11, 2013, at 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Thursday, October 10, 2013 8:58:30 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html
> A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers
don't
> understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A
mechanical
> description of a function is not the same thing as participating
in an
> experience.
This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can
perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic
sensibility,
it must have aesthetic sensibility.
Not at all. That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying. The
failure of digital mechanism to interface with aesthetic presence
is not testable unless you yourself become a digital mechanism.
There can never be a test of aesthetic sensibility because testing
is by definition anesthetic. To test is to measure into a system of
universal representation. Measurement is the removal of presence
for the purpose of distribution as symbol. I can draw a picture of
a robot correctly identifying a vegetable, but that doesn't mean
that the drawing of the robot is doing anything. I can make a movie
of the robot cartoon, or a sculpture, or an animated sculpture that
has a sensor for iodine or magnesium which can be correlated to a
higher probability of a particular vegetable, but that doesn't
change anything at all. There is still no robot except in our
experience and our expectations of its experience. The robot is not
even a zombie, it is a puppet playing back recordings of our
thoughts in a clever way.
OK, so it would prove nothing to you if the supermarket computers
did a better job than the checkout chicks. Why then did you cite
this article?
Because the article is consistent with my view that there is a
fundamental difference between quantitative tasks and aesthetic
awareness. If there were no difference, then I would expect that the
problems that supermarket computers would have would not be related
to its unconsciousness, but to unreliability or even willfulness
developing. Why isn't the story "Automated cashiers have begun
throwing temper tantrums at some locations which are contagious to
certain smart phones that now become upset in sympathy...we had
anticipated this, but not so soon, yadda yadda"? I think it's pretty
clear why. For the same reason that all machines will always fall
short of authentic personality and sensitivity.
So you would just say that computers lack authentic personality and
sensitivity, no matter what they did.
Beyond question, yes. I wouldn't just say it, I would bet my life on
it, because I understand it completely.
Do you believe that computers can perform any task a human can
perform? If not, what is an example of a relatively simple task that
a computer could never perform?
I thought Craig just made clear that computers might performs as well
as humans, and that even in that case, he will not attribute sense and
aesthetic to them.
This was already clear with my sun-in-law (who got an artificial
brain, and who can't enjoy a good meal at his restaurant).
He call them puppets, but he believes in philosophical zombies.
He is coherent, but invalid in his debunking of comp. He debunks only
the 19th century conception of machines (controllable physical beings).
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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