On 19 Oct 2013, at 10:00, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb
<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you
can even say in truth there is only one "I"
In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different
chain => different person. It seems more accurate to say there
is no "I".
But the chain is immortal and cyclic,
Why do you assume it's cyclic? Where was it before life evolved?
convoluted with periods of amnesia,
Amnesia = gap in the chain.
branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.
Sounds like wishful thinking.
Why? It entails that there is only one person,
Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over
and over.
Like in Gödel rotative universe.
But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute
time to the living of an experience. In the UD all experiences are
"lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique, and the
infinity will play a role only in the statistics on the relative
futures.
We belong all the "time" to finite computations, cyclic
computations, and infinite non cyclic computations.
At first sight, only those last one can change the relative measure
on the consistent extensions, so we can say that finite and cyclic
computations have a measure zero for the 1_p.
Why should cyclic computations not have as much weight towards some
particular state as an infinite computation that is not cyclic? Is
it because there are an infinite number of these non-cyclic
computations all proceeding through that state an an infinite number
of times (and hence a larger infinity)?
Because non cyclic computations can dovetail on the reals (or infinite
duplications), making the computations non enumerable, and giving them
in this way a measure different from zero.
This is intuitive, but partially conformed by the semantics possible
for the " # & p" povs (hypostases).
Bruno
Jason
Of course this needs some "AUDA-confirmation", but the fact that the
S4Grz logic is a temporal logic is promising for this. I think.
Bruno
Brent
and that is deducible from the statement that the two Washington
and Moscow copies are and stay the same Helsinki-person.
It is also coherent with what results from identifying oneself
with the universal machine that we are, or the Löbian one. We
might be that machine, in different context. We know she has an
already very sophisticated (Plotinian) theology.
(Then salvia seems to be able to make us conceive that she is
conscious, and that her consciousness is out of time, space, etc.
That is admittedly very weird).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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