On Monday, October 21, 2013 1:37:22 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 20 Oct 2013, at 21:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 20, 2013 1:26:30 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 20 Oct 2013, at 17:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> > Not at all. the modal logics are entirely determined by the initial >> > axioms. >> > >> > This is the problem. I do not allow any initial freestanding axioms. >> >> The modal logics are not free, their are derived in arithmetic. >> > > Arithmetic is derived from the possibility of measurement though - > > > > Not at the relevant level. >
Why not? In what way can we say that arithmetic transcends measurement? > > > > > which supervenes on all sorts of senses of position, duration, > recursiveness, sequence, etc. I will always continue to bring this up, but > you don't acknowledge it. While it can be argued that a sense primitive is > no less miraculous than an arithmetic primitive, the difference is that > arithmetic follows easily from sense, but sense does not follow at all from > arithmetic, > > > > Derive arithmetic from sense. I ask you this before, but it was not a > derivation, in the usual sense when doing science. > I think that arithmetic derives from the sense of appreciation for fixed consequence. It serves to reflect the early branching of sense from direct to (direct + indirect). It's a way of relating to an experience indirectly, through gaps of insensitivity, so that it can be felt to follow other experiences and be followed by them. Arithmetic is the creation of space and time through the masking of pansensitivity against its near-opposite. unless you smuggle sense into your definition of arithmetic from the start. That would be ok too, but it is not what we see in reality. We do not see experiences appearing out of the interaction of abstract 'rules', and we only see rules as a consequence of pattern recognition applied to experience. ? > Games use rules, but rules do not use games. > > The initial sensivity (your term) used here (AUDA) is only your > understanding of the arithmetical laws of addition and > multiplication, (and of the machines, whose existence and activities > are derived from that. > I don't see that the capacity for sensation has anything at all to do with addition or multiplication. I assume this. "Not seeing" is not a problem. I don't see it entirely > myself. Machines can't see it, nor believe it. > > But you keep talking like "seeing that not ...". > > "Not seeing" does not imply "seeing that not". > It depends whether there is anything that is seeing. It could very well mean that not seeing is seeing that not, in the case that there is nothing to see. Since we do see addition and multiplication, and we do see feeling and sensation, and we see that the relation between the two are counterintuitive at best, we should not take the word of something other than us, which may not experience anything, to tell us about experience. To me, all of our experiences with machines, automation, programs, etc points clearly to the sterility of addition and multiplication - that it is repeating repetition without significant teleological or aesthetic potential. There seems to be no bottom-up path that connects mechanism to feeling, however there is a top-down path through which feeling can polarize itself into a reduction of relative feeling. In fact, addition and multiplication are strategies of bypassing sensation. Mathematics is for reductive representation - the collapsing of living experiences into logical facades. This is true in all cases of computation - it is a strategy of exploiting dumber levels of sense for purposes of automation and separation of repetitive tasks from active awareness. I will continue to make this point also, even though you don't acknowledge it. That math before Gödel and Turing. > Is there somewhere that Gödel and Turing cite addition and multiplication as the source for sensation and life? > > You can start from sensitivity, but then you are a poet, not a > scientist. > That's the old definition of a scientist. Relativity, QM, and Godel have changed that forever but few people have recognized it yet. Poetry is the frontier of science, or science is forever stuck being apologetics for engineering. > I can only disagree. > > Gödel + comp, might be used to justify poetry done by machine. > But it does not imply substituting science methodology for poetry, is > certainly not in the mind of Gödel, or any quantum physicists. > Nobody is suggesting substitution. Scientific methodology is essential, just as naive realism is essential. What I am saying is that the way forward is to use science on itself, challenge objectivity, and recover a new sense of direct participation in the universe as a living piece of art. > Poetry is important, but it is not science, and it is bas poetry when > it pretend some truth, and denies a respectful attitude toward > possible creatures. > All life depends on disrespecting other creatures, except perhaps photosynthesizing eukaryotes. Beyond that, it is about elevating one's group above the others, and eating them when delicious. We can't eat computers, so unless they are going to serve our interests exclusively, the possibility of their rivalry should be avoided if it was legitimate. I of course have no fear of such a rivalry because I am confident that no machine will ever be a possible creature, any more than a cartoon will possibly be a creature. > > But you are a machine under comp and you CAN believe consistently > > that you are a machine. > > This is ambiguous, and when made precise, leads to not so obvious > questions, or simple falsities (I cannot believe consistently that I > am consistent). > Comp is refutable, so more precise questions are open problems. > That sounds like a concession in disguise. Nope. It is the main result. > You are saying 'everyone is a machine and machines believe this lie', and I respond 'you don't believe the lie yet you are like everyone else'. Then you say something about open problems, ambiguity, refutables, non-obvious questions.. It sounds like you don't have a plan for what happens to the definition of what machines believe when machines figure out that they are machines. What happens when we factor in universal machines who understand how universal machines work? When they can prove to themselves, as you have, that any concept of non-comp is probably ultimately illusion, then that core principle of 1p integration falls apart. Then you have infinite regress of universal mathematician machines who doubt their doubting of doubt. I begin from the other direction. Before we can have doubt, we must have some connection to that which can be doubted - to presence, to sense experience. I think it works better that way from the absolute perspective. You can do that. It is an emphasizing of the first person discourse. > > The problem is when you infer from that discourse that machines are not > allowed to do it too. > That sounds like an admission that yes, the definition of a machine includes a set of beliefs and it includes the opposite set of beliefs. It makes machine into a word to mean whatever you like. > > > > Proofs have no existence without a conscious prover. Proof is > > nothing but an expectation of matching one set of experiences to > > another. > > We have made progress about things like provability, formal, informal, > and computability. You might study this a little bit. > I think the study of those things is what gets us tangled up in a very narrow aspect of sense. This shows only how much you have not studied them. > That's exactly what someone would say if their focus were very narrow. Not that they are bad things to study, but for deep understanding of consciousness, they are a deadly hall of mirrors which reinforce each others assumptions. > Nice rethoric, but I will no more comment rethoric. > > > > The relation of arithmetic to qualia is completely fabricated and > > has no basis in mathematics as far as I can tell. > > You beg the question. Even if the relation between qualia and > arithmetic that I describe as deriving from comp and the classical > theory of knowledge is wrong, you have to show that all possible comp > theories are wrong. > All possible comp theories are wrong because what all computation has in common is the elevation of representation over aesthetic presence. Why? > Because the nature of computation is to reduce to an anesthetic quantity which can be used as a generic representation. To compute is to ignore all qualities except for the single dimension being counted. It is to reduce all being and feeling to insensitive objects of knowing and doing. If I understand that the Moon is made of minerals I do not have to show that all possible green cheese theories are wrong. "Maybe there is a kind of green cheese that does not look very green, and seems like dust and rock..." I don't say that cannot be true, or that people should not check it out, but I don't personally see any reason to doubt the explanation that seems to make much more sense. That's not an argument. > Does that mean it isn't true? > > I'm not talking about computer science, I'm talking about > > consciousness, metaphysics, and cosmology. > > > You have to address computer science when saying that computers cannot > emulate consciousness. > But indeed, you seem to just ignore the machines, so you don't gave > them any chance. > I don't ignore the machines, they ignore me. Hey computer! I'm talking to you now! Yoohoo, ghosts of the future internet traveling backward through simulated time...I'm right here, talking a whole mess o insulting stuff about your family! Come and get me! Come on and emulate a consciousness to trick me into buying some expensive cookware. > > > > >> I am specifically challenging the assumption that computation or > >> arithmetic is elementary, > > > > > > It is not. > > > > Then what are you saying is elementary? > > 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. > > I meant that computation are not elementary, or assumed. It is defined > from 0, s(0), ... and the laws of + and *. > I think that 0, s(s(0)), and the laws of + and * should not be assumed to be irreducible. They can be reduce to combinators. > But combinators are not taught in schools. > Still, combinators are mentally abstracted from sensory expectations. What is "+"? It is feeling of augmentation, of more of (x). This is derived from experience, since a lot of experience has themes of augmentation. That doesn't mean that + is literally real. It only means that under conditions where augmentation can be measured precisely, we can expect certain sensible relationships to be revealed. Its all rooted in a capacity to make sense in this very literal, didactic way where all is exposed and no poetry is allowed. >I don't mind what '+' is, if you agree that, for all numbers x and y we have >x + 0 = x >x + s(y) = s(x + y) >Then we reason only from such axioms. These are axioms that only apply to mathematical contexts. They don't get us any closer to flavors or colors. > > > Then you have to provide just one counter-example. > > > > I am the counter-example. Color is the counter example. Flavor, > > sound, feeling, etc. > > > You beg the question. Comp already explain why the 1p says so, but > that is an (machine's) opinion/feeling. > You are not a counter-example to comp. On the contrary you illustrate > very well the comp prediction that comp is hard to believe by machines > introspecting themselves a little bit. > Then you illustrate the failure of that same comp prediction since you do not find it hard to believe comp. >I find extremely hard to believe in comp. >Without the QM confirmation on its most startling consequences (we have infinities of bodies), I might >just disbelieve in it. But you still override your disbelief with meta-belief. If machines do that, then there is no point in making an issue about their disbelief in comp. The thermometer that is always wrong but says 'the appearance that this thermometer is wrong is an illusion' is not the secret of consciousness, it is the imposter - the ontological Mad Hatter conjuring white rabbits. The step to take from there is not within intelligence, it is within wisdom, intuition, courage, and faith (if you must). Doubt fails when you can no longer trust your ability to doubt that which tells you that you cannot be trusted. The fact is, we have never seen a concrete experience which follows only from a disembodied rule or law. We have never seen a machine that can care or not care about its own experience. You don't know that. We don't find any evidence of that when we look at animals and humans. The empirical evidence are that nature exploits computable phenomena. Empirical evidence is already biased toward computation. It is a forensic reconstruction. What we find when we look at animals is beyond evidence, it is direct aesthetic presence. We need only look at the difference between a newborn organism and the boot sequence of a computer. The former emerges from a history of experience as a unique character. The latter emerges from isolation as an abstract sequence of generic codes. > Comp, like the Gödelian sentences, says something like "you can't > believe in me". That is why it asks for an act of faith. > No, I think that's why it returns faith to you. The act of faith is in realizing that mathematical forms, even though they have the appearance of profound objective truth, are actually empty addresses that define the edges of experience. Gödel is not about having faith in the omniscience of numbers, it is about faith in the limitations of formal descriptions of all kinds to ever tap into the primordial source. They can only reflect, in their incompleteness, the absolute completeness of the pansensitive capacity to pretend. >But machines understand this. If they seem to I think it is because you are reading into their tea leaves too literally. > > Not true. There are no elementary axioms. Axioms are rules. > > Logicians distinguish axioms (which are formula, or sentences), and > rules, which are operations on formulas leading to other formula. It > is as different as a number, like 0, and an operation like s (s(x) = x > + 1). > Ok, good to know. Still, formula or sentences can be casually understood as 'rules', or 'logical conditions', or 'codified expectations'...whatever we want to label them, they are disembodied analytical figures, not presences. > Sure. That is what the Bp & p versus Bp will explains. They explain that they are epiphenomenal? > > I have to go, but I have read the other comment, and either you are > not providing any reason to believe that comp is false or inconsistent. > As far as I can see, all of our disagreement stems from our opposite stances on whether comp must be given the benefit of the doubt. The reason why my hypothesis denies the comp hypothesis is because 1) there is undoubtedly sensory experience. I agree. and 2) sensory experience is not necessary for interpretation of quantitative data. >I disagree. Sensory experience can be unavoidable semantical fixed point for some computable >self-transformation. Why would it be unavoidable? If you need a fixed point for a computable self-transformation why would it have to be felt semantically? Why not a logical rule? >Assuming comp, many fixed points will behave like if the machine is not a zombie, and the machine has already the mean to refute attempt to be treated as a particular zombie, or even body, or any third person things. A copy machine can copy Shakespeare. Shredding copies of Shakespeare and putting them in some order doesn't mean the copier or shredder is Shakespeare. There may be patterns which relate to super-personal or super-natural reflections of Shakespeare or the person reading the cut-up, but that does not make any part of the mechanism into a person. Everything that I have seen from comp is retrospective views of qualia, where comp just digs a hole and puts a carpet over it and sum-body stands next to it and says 'you can't prove that there's no qualia in there'. >Well, you are the one saying the big thing: "I have a proof, or I know, that there is no qualia there". I'm not saying that I know, I am saying that I understand why there should not be qualia there and why it is tempting to make the mistake of assuming it would be there. Everything from blindsight, to synesthesia, to puppetry and cartoons and actors points to a fundamental discontinuity between presentation and representation. >Bp & p is not representable. But comp makes it still present. I don't think that's true because comp itself can only represent. In what form does comp present Bp & p other than within its own numerical cartoons? There is no reason to naively swallow the assumption that something which reminds us of ourselves - which we have designed to remind us of the way that we think, cannot in fact be as dumb as a doorknob. >Hmm... The UM has been discovered, and the interview today has been a sequence of surprising results in mathematical logic. Nothing was programmed there by us. Nobody but machines proposed G and even G* (in some sense). I don't think that machines propose anything. It is our interpretation of machines only. Like the Mandelbrot set - it is meaningless as a presentation of sound or of smell. It is only as a visual display that suddenly it seems to us as a profound proposal. Craig Bruno We have seen over and over how easy it is to project superstition onto inanimate objects, and I have no problem with using such things as oracles to tap into our super-personal intuitions (as long as we don't take them for absolute truth), but that is not the same thing as concluding that the magic 8-ball itself must literally be alive just because it never says anything when we ask certain questions. There are other, more nuanced explanations, and I think that I have begun to understand some of them. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
