On 28 Oct 2013, at 20:33, Richard Ruquist wrote:

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Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail thatyou can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are themachine that computes because they are enumerable.

`I am not sure I found a proof of this in your papers. You might`

`elaborate. being enumerable entails "capable of being computed", not`

`necessarily "capable of (universal) computing (only very special`

`enumerable set can universally compute (the so-called "creative set",`

`discovered by Emil Post).`

It derives everything else. In particular the Metaverse machinederives the universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannotsay what derives the Metaverse machineBruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter inarithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive themachine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matterlives in the machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short).If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough topercolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outsideof comp? That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derivedphysical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it?

`I think Quentin answered this. Comp makes the beliefs (by relative-`

`number/machines) in matter derivable from arithmetic. There is no`

`matter per se. Stable matter comes from the first plural coherence of`

`some type of dreams.`

NUMBER ==> Machines' dreams ===> Matter appearances and physical laws.

Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physicsbecomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universalmachine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choiceof the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement thatcomp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion.

`Comp explains where the hallucination of matter comes from, and should`

`explain why it is persistent. But there is no matter in the ontology.`

`Matter becomes an epistemological/psychological/theological notion.`

The poet said it: life is but a dream.

`But it is not necessarily a solipsist one. It can and should be a sort`

`of multi-user video game. I don't believe in "ontological primitive`

`matter", but I have almost no doubts about the existence of Richard`

`Ruquist. With comp infinitely many Richard Ruquist's mind states are`

`defined through infinitely many number relations.`

Bruno

On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote:Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com 4:53 AM (2 hours ago) to everything-list On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse.How?Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi-Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonicvariation of the fine structure constant across the visible universe.The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you canderive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.>It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but thatcannot be the case if our>(generalized) brain is computable. Richard: That does not make sense.If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S,whatever will happen to me is determined by *all* computations goingthrough the state S (or equivalent). Our first person indeterminacydomain is an infinite and non computable set of computations. Theindeterminacy domain is not computable because we cannot recognizeour 1p in 3p-computations (like the one done by the UD).Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper.You need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does notpresuppose any special knowledge.It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features.Keep in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included inthe provable (by universal machine) strictly included in truth.Computable is Turing equivalent with sigma_1 provable, butarithmetical truth is given by the union of all sigma_i, for i = 0,1, 2, 3, ... (this needs a bit of theoretical computer science).Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic,but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine'sbelief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives inthe machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short).If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough topercolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.By the UDA, and classical logic, you get the physical certainty, bythe true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (the UD-accessible states),which are provable (true in all consistent extensions) andconsistent (such accessible consistent extensions have to exist).That's basically, for all p sigma_1 (= "ExP(x") for some P decidablearithmetical formula) beweisbar('p') & ~beweisbar('~p') & p. Theoperator for that, let us write it "[]", provides a quantum logic,by the application of "[]<>p". This gives a quantization ofarithmetic due to the fact, introspectively deducible by alluniversal machines, that we cannot really know who we are and whichcomputations and universal numbers sustain us. Below oursubstitution level, things *have* to become a bit fuzzy, nonclonable, non computable, indeterminate.In fact this answers a question asked by Wheeler, and on which GĂ¶delsaid only that the question makes no sense and is even indecent! Thequestion was "would there be a relationship between incompletenessand Heisenberg uncertainties?"There is no direct derivation of Heisenberg uncertainty fromincompleteness, as that would be indecent indeed, but assuming compand understanding the FPI, you can intuit why the fuzziness has toemerge from inside the digital/arithmetic, below or at oursubstitution level, and the math of self-reference gives a quick wayto get the propositional logic of that "universalphysics" (deducible by all correct computationalist UMs).And there is the Solovay gifts, which are theorems which show thatincompleteness split those logics,. That is useful fordistinguishing the true part of that physics from the part that themachine can (still introspectively) deduces. Some intensionalnuances, like the "[]" above, inherit the split, some like the Bp &p does not, and facts of that type can help to delineate the quantafrom the qualia, but also the terrestrial (temporal) from the divine(atemporal).Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomeselementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's pointof view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universalsystem chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.Comp suggests to extend Everett on the universal quantum wave onarithmetic and the universal machines dreams. The wavy aspect beingexplained by the self-embedding in arithmetic. Comp entails a sortof self-diffraction.No problem trying to get the fundamental physics from observation,and indeed that will help for the comparison. The approach herekeep the 1/p 3/p distinctions all along, and in that sense proposesa new formulation, and ways to consider, the mind-body problem (inwhich I am interested and is the main motivation for interviewingthe antic, the contemporaries and the universal numbers :)Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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