Hi Richard ,

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I do not use religion in a pejorative sense. Actually I am a Hindu. (At least I was until I got kicked out of the Muktananda Ashram)And so I am religiously in agreement with physical reality being anillusion.

Interesting.

However, I am also a physicist and my string cosmology goes againstmy religion.As a physicist I am an Aristotelian, but not one who discounts thesupernatural.

`I don't really know what "supernatural" can mean. Like Gödel said to`

`Einstein, "I don't believe in the natural world/science". I believe`

`only in the natural numbers, and in the laws of addition and`

`multiplication.`

Arbitrary real number are already supernatural for me.

So I am pleased to finally understand why I cannot understand you.

`But what I believe is not related with what I do in my job. I just`

`show that IF my brain (in a weak generalized sense, it is whatever I`

`need to emulate digitally to survive, when assuming comp) is Turing`

`emulable, then physics must be justified entirely by the theology of`

`number (itself part of arithmetic).`

And I must say that I appreciate your polite and truthful responses esp compared to Quentins "and a chicken is a dog" sham response.

`Sometimes Quentin is a bit direct, but I think that he means well and`

`like you, don't use rhetorical tricks unlike some others.`

PS: I originally said that the CY manifolds were numerable meaning that they can be numbered. Is that incorrect usage?

`I use "enumerable", or "countable", both for finite and infinite sets`

`(in that case there is a computable, or not, bijection between the set`

`and the set of natural numbers). Numerable is OK. Important concept`

`get many names.`

Best, Bruno

On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 29 Oct 2013, at 03:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:So matter is just maya-illusion.Yes. That's the result. UDA shows that if we can survive with adigital brain, by virtue of its infomation handling power (and notsome magic), then matter is only appearance in the mind of some(relative) numbers.That's the key point.That is really religion- right?Hmm... The tone used here makes me suspecting that you are using"religion" in some pejorative sense.But yes it is theology. I insist on this almost at the start: compis the belief in a form of technological reincarnation, and as such,cannot be justified rationally. We have to bet.. But we can do thatbet from evidences (nature exploits replacement all the times, theknown laws are all Turing emulable, etc.).It means also that if a scientist says "science as shown that we aremachine", that scientist is a pseudo-scientist, or a pseudo-priest,or some con who want steal your money.Comp is "yes doctor", and it entails the right to say "No, doctor".Comp makes number theology the most fundamental science unifying allthe others. Indeed.Of course today's theology has not yet come back to the academy, andinstitutionalized theologies are politicized and used to controlpeople. We are still in an era where we tolerated authoritativearguments in religion (and other human sciences), where actually itis the place where such arguments are the most wrong possible.The enlightenment period was half-enlightenment. All sciences gothrough, except the most fundamental one: theology. Theology hasbeen scientific only with the Greeks, Chinese and Indian. InOccident it is still a taboo.I like to say: bad faith fears reason, bad reason fears faith. BrunoOn Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail thatyou can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part ofphysics.Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are themachine that computes because they are enumerable. It deriveseverything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives theuniverse big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say whatderives the Metaverse machineBruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter inarithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive themachine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, butmatter lives in the machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to beshort).If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough topercolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outsideof comp?No, matter is an appearance hence the use of "machine's belief inmatter". There is no primary matter (assuming comp).That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derivedphysical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it?Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physicsbecomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universalmachine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choiceof the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement thatcomp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion.On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote:Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com 4:53 AM (2 hours ago) to everything-list On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse.How?Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi-Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonicvariation of the fine structure constant across the visibleuniverse.The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you canderive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.>It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but thatcannot be the case if our>(generalized) brain is computable. Richard: That does not make sense.If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S,whatever will happen to me is determined by *all* computationsgoing through the state S (or equivalent). Our first personindeterminacy domain is an infinite and non computable set ofcomputations. The indeterminacy domain is not computable because wecannot recognize our 1p in 3p-computations (like the one done bythe UD).Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper.You need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does notpresuppose any special knowledge.It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features.Keep in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included inthe provable (by universal machine) strictly included in truth.Computable is Turing equivalent with sigma_1 provable, butarithmetical truth is given by the union of all sigma_i, for i = 0,1, 2, 3, ... (this needs a bit of theoretical computer science).Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic,but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine'sbelief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives inthe machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short).If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough topercolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.By the UDA, and classical logic, you get the physical certainty, bythe true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (the UD-accessible states),which are provable (true in all consistent extensions) andconsistent (such accessible consistent extensions have to exist).That's basically, for all p sigma_1 (= "ExP(x") for some Pdecidable arithmetical formula) beweisbar('p') & ~beweisbar('~p') &p. The operator for that, let us write it "[]", provides a quantumlogic, by the application of "[]<>p". This gives a quantization ofarithmetic due to the fact, introspectively deducible by alluniversal machines, that we cannot really know who we are and whichcomputations and universal numbers sustain us. Below oursubstitution level, things *have* to become a bit fuzzy, nonclonable, non computable, indeterminate.In fact this answers a question asked by Wheeler, and on whichGödel said only that the question makes no sense and is evenindecent! The question was "would there be a relationship betweenincompleteness and Heisenberg uncertainties?"There is no direct derivation of Heisenberg uncertainty fromincompleteness, as that would be indecent indeed, but assuming compand understanding the FPI, you can intuit why the fuzziness has toemerge from inside the digital/arithmetic, below or at oursubstitution level, and the math of self-reference gives a quickway to get the propositional logic of that "universalphysics" (deducible by all correct computationalist UMs).And there is the Solovay gifts, which are theorems which show thatincompleteness split those logics,. That is useful fordistinguishing the true part of that physics from the part that themachine can (still introspectively) deduces. Some intensionalnuances, like the "[]" above, inherit the split, some like the Bp &p does not, and facts of that type can help to delineate the quantafrom the qualia, but also the terrestrial (temporal) from thedivine (atemporal).Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomeselementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's pointof view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universalsystem chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.Comp suggests to extend Everett on the universal quantum wave onarithmetic and the universal machines dreams. The wavy aspectbeing explained by the self-embedding in arithmetic. Comp entails asort of self-diffraction.No problem trying to get the fundamental physics from observation,and indeed that will help for the comparison. The approach herekeep the 1/p 3/p distinctions all along, and in that sense proposesa new formulation, and ways to consider, the mind-body problem (inwhich I am interested and is the main motivation for interviewingthe antic, the contemporaries and the universal numbers :)Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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