Hi Richard ,


I do not use religion in a pejorative sense. Actually I am a Hindu.
(At least I was until I got kicked out of the Muktananda Ashram)
And so I am religiously in agreement with physical reality being an illusion.


Interesting.




However, I am also a physicist and my string cosmology goes against my religion. As a physicist I am an Aristotelian, but not one who discounts the supernatural.

I don't really know what "supernatural" can mean. Like Gödel said to Einstein, "I don't believe in the natural world/science". I believe only in the natural numbers, and in the laws of addition and multiplication.
Arbitrary real number are already supernatural for me.



So I am pleased to finally understand why I cannot understand you.

But what I believe is not related with what I do in my job. I just show that IF my brain (in a weak generalized sense, it is whatever I need to emulate digitally to survive, when assuming comp) is Turing emulable, then physics must be justified entirely by the theology of number (itself part of arithmetic).



And I must say that I appreciate your polite and truthful responses
esp compared to Quentins "and a chicken is a dog" sham response.

Sometimes Quentin is a bit direct, but I think that he means well and like you, don't use rhetorical tricks unlike some others.



PS: I originally said that the CY manifolds were numerable
meaning that they can be numbered. Is that incorrect usage?

I use "enumerable", or "countable", both for finite and infinite sets (in that case there is a computable, or not, bijection between the set and the set of natural numbers). Numerable is OK. Important concept get many names.

Best,

Bruno







On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 29 Oct 2013, at 03:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:

So matter is just maya-illusion.

Yes. That's the result. UDA shows that if we can survive with a digital brain, by virtue of its infomation handling power (and not some magic), then matter is only appearance in the mind of some (relative) numbers.
That's the key point.


That is really religion- right?

Hmm... The tone used here makes me suspecting that you are using "religion" in some pejorative sense. But yes it is theology. I insist on this almost at the start: comp is the belief in a form of technological reincarnation, and as such, cannot be justified rationally. We have to bet.. But we can do that bet from evidences (nature exploits replacement all the times, the known laws are all Turing emulable, etc.).

It means also that if a scientist says "science as shown that we are machine", that scientist is a pseudo-scientist, or a pseudo-priest, or some con who want steal your money.
Comp is "yes doctor", and it entails the right to say "No, doctor".

Comp makes number theology the most fundamental science unifying all the others. Indeed.

Of course today's theology has not yet come back to the academy, and institutionalized theologies are politicized and used to control people. We are still in an era where we tolerated authoritative arguments in religion (and other human sciences), where actually it is the place where such arguments are the most wrong possible.

The enlightenment period was half-enlightenment. All sciences go through, except the most fundamental one: theology. Theology has been scientific only with the Greeks, Chinese and Indian. In Occident it is still a taboo.

I like to say: bad faith fears reason, bad reason fears faith.

Bruno





On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:



2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.

Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the machine that computes because they are enumerable. It derives everything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives the universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say what derives the Metaverse machine

Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.

Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside of comp?

No, matter is an appearance hence the use of "machine's belief in matter". There is no primary matter (assuming comp).

That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it?

Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.

Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that comp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion.


On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com
4:53 AM (2 hours ago)



to everything-list

On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:

It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse.


How?

Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi- Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic variation of the fine structure constant across the visible universe.

The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.





>It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but that cannot be the case if our

>(generalized) brain is computable.

Richard: That does not make sense.


If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S, whatever will happen to me is determined by *all* computations going through the state S (or equivalent). Our first person indeterminacy domain is an infinite and non computable set of computations. The indeterminacy domain is not computable because we cannot recognize our 1p in 3p-computations (like the one done by the UD). Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper. You need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does not presuppose any special knowledge. It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features. Keep in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included in the provable (by universal machine) strictly included in truth. Computable is Turing equivalent with sigma_1 provable, but arithmetical truth is given by the union of all sigma_i, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... (this needs a bit of theoretical computer science).

Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which "cohere enough" (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.

By the UDA, and classical logic, you get the physical certainty, by the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (the UD-accessible states), which are provable (true in all consistent extensions) and consistent (such accessible consistent extensions have to exist). That's basically, for all p sigma_1 (= "ExP(x") for some P decidable arithmetical formula) beweisbar('p') & ~beweisbar('~p') & p. The operator for that, let us write it "[]", provides a quantum logic, by the application of "[]<>p". This gives a quantization of arithmetic due to the fact, introspectively deducible by all universal machines, that we cannot really know who we are and which computations and universal numbers sustain us. Below our substitution level, things *have* to become a bit fuzzy, non clonable, non computable, indeterminate.

In fact this answers a question asked by Wheeler, and on which Gödel said only that the question makes no sense and is even indecent! The question was "would there be a relationship between incompleteness and Heisenberg uncertainties?"

There is no direct derivation of Heisenberg uncertainty from incompleteness, as that would be indecent indeed, but assuming comp and understanding the FPI, you can intuit why the fuzziness has to emerge from inside the digital/arithmetic, below or at our substitution level, and the math of self-reference gives a quick way to get the propositional logic of that "universal physics" (deducible by all correct computationalist UMs).

And there is the Solovay gifts, which are theorems which show that incompleteness split those logics,. That is useful for distinguishing the true part of that physics from the part that the machine can (still introspectively) deduces. Some intensional nuances, like the "[]" above, inherit the split, some like the Bp & p does not, and facts of that type can help to delineate the quanta from the qualia, but also the terrestrial (temporal) from the divine (atemporal).

Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.

Comp suggests to extend Everett on the universal quantum wave on arithmetic and the universal machines dreams. The wavy aspect being explained by the self-embedding in arithmetic. Comp entails a sort of self-diffraction.

No problem trying to get the fundamental physics from observation, and indeed that will help for the comparison. The approach here keep the 1/p 3/p distinctions all along, and in that sense proposes a new formulation, and ways to consider, the mind-body problem (in which I am interested and is the main motivation for interviewing the antic, the contemporaries and the universal numbers :)


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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