On 02 Dec 2013, at 21:52, LizR wrote:
On 3 December 2013 09:49, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
2013/12/2 LizR <lizj...@gmail.com>
On 3 December 2013 09:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/2/2013 8:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I'm sorry but we will have to agree we disagree on that. You're
also misleading atheistic position, and you're wrongly attributing
"belief" to atheist people (especially belgians)... I'm belgian,
I'm not a materialist, I consider myself atheist in regards of
religions, and that's what most atheist means when they say they
are atheist.
Call it "ultimate reality". It is OK, until you grasp enough of
comp to see that this rings a bit faulty.
There is no problem to call it "ultimate reality", as long as you
are open it might have "personal" aspects, and have no prejudice on
wht that "ultimate reality" can be (with this or that hypothesis).
Then you should have no prejudice toward accepting matter as the
possible "ultimate reality". It too might have personal aspect.
I believe Bruno's only "prejudice" about this is he thinks it leads
to a contradiction.
Assuming computationalism...
I was taking that as read. But yes, Bruno also thinks that if you
don't assume computationalism, you have to adopt a supernatural
stance towards consciousness, and I imagine he's prejudiced against
that!
If you don't assume computationalism you have to adopt a supernatural
stance towards "Matter". (That's the point), and on consciousness.
But even with computationalism, about consciousness, you can't avoid
some amount of magic when you get reconnected or when you feel so. You
get bits of information, you select realities, and you are aware of
that. Consciousness will be "obviously true" only on the conjunction
of the believed and truth, but *that* consciousness remains invariant
for local change or distortion of belief unrelated with the most
probable truth" (like in a dream).
It makes the relation between machines and truth quite non-trivial.
Bruno
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