Bruno, I expected better from you. You seem to restrict the unlimited possibilities into the PRESENT limitations of our imagination. Do you have any support for the exclusivity of computationalism over ALL (so far maybe not even thought about) systems that MAY work? Do you have support for YOUR version of "consciousness" as the ONLY possible input for "Matter" (as we THINK of it TODAY?)
And: I have no idea what would you cover by YOUR truth? John M On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 4:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 02 Dec 2013, at 21:52, LizR wrote: > > On 3 December 2013 09:49, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> 2013/12/2 LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> >> >>> On 3 December 2013 09:40, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> On 12/2/2013 8:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> I'm sorry but we will have to agree we disagree on that. You're also >>>> misleading atheistic position, and you're wrongly attributing "belief" to >>>> atheist people (especially belgians)... I'm belgian, I'm not a materialist, >>>> I consider myself atheist in regards of religions, and that's what most >>>> atheist means when they say they are atheist. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Call it "ultimate reality". It is OK, until you grasp enough of comp >>>> to see that this rings a bit faulty. >>>> >>>> There is no problem to call it "ultimate reality", as long as you are >>>> open it might have "personal" aspects, and have no prejudice on wht that >>>> "ultimate reality" can be (with this or that hypothesis). >>>> >>>> >>>> Then you should have no prejudice toward accepting matter as the >>>> possible "ultimate reality". It too might have personal aspect. >>>> >>>> I believe Bruno's only "prejudice" about this is he thinks it leads to >>> a contradiction. >>> >> >> Assuming computationalism... >> >> I was taking that as read. But yes, Bruno also thinks that if you don't > assume computationalism, you have to adopt a supernatural stance towards > consciousness, and I imagine he's prejudiced against *that!* > > > If you don't assume computationalism you have to adopt a supernatural > stance towards "Matter". (That's the point), and on consciousness. > > But even with computationalism, about consciousness, you can't avoid some > amount of magic when you get reconnected or when you feel so. You get bits > of information, you select realities, and you are aware of that. > Consciousness will be "obviously true" only on the conjunction of the > believed and truth, but *that* consciousness remains invariant for local > change or distortion of belief unrelated with the most probable truth" > (like in a dream). > It makes the relation between machines and truth quite non-trivial. > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
