Bruno: Comp is computationalism, and I "pretend" (at the least) to derive
the consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a scientist, just
accept the definition given, and show a flaw in the derivation. The very
fact that you don't act like that suggests that you are not interested in
finding the flaw, if it exists.

Richard: I suggest that comp and esp MWI may be flawed on the empirical
basis of photosynthesis where quantum coherence allows the incoming
electron (as they say) to sample every possible superposition or MWI
pathway and then chooses the optimal path. I do not know that to be true,
but that appears to be the scientific consensus. If MWI were true, every
possible pathway, as they say, would be chosen and not just the optimal
one. I posted this once before but got no response.
http://www.neuroquantology.com/index.php/journal/announcement/view/68
Superposition in Photosynthesis


On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 09 Dec 2013, at 18:45, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 3:52 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
> > I mean what everybody mean by computationalism in the cognitive science
>>
>
> Bullshit. "Comp" differs from computationalism in that "comp" includes all
> the silly (and contradictory) conclusions from your error riddled "proof".
>
>
> Comp is computationalism, and I "pretend" (at the least) to derive the
> consequences from it. So, if you want to act like a scientist, just accept
> the definition given, and show a flaw in the derivation. The very fact that
> you don't act like that suggests that you are not interested in finding the
> flaw, if it exists.
>
>
>
>
> > We assume comp!
>>
>
> Every logical man should assume computationalism,
>
>
> This is simply ridiculous. It is logically conceivable that comp might be
> wrong. You are really saying that "my axioms" are true, which is philosophy
> (I don't do that). You confuse science and philosophy.
>
>
>
>
>
> no logical man should assume "comp", the ideas behind it are as
> nonstandard as the word itself.
>
>
> "comp" is derived from comp. So, "comp" is never assumed. Only comp. It is
> up to you to show a flaw if you disbelieve that "comp" follows from comp.
>
>
>
> >  we can put our shoes in them.
>>
>
> That's not the problem. In your duplicating machine thought experiment
> there are lots and lots of shoes around and one pair is no better than
> another,
>
>
> Good. that's part of why the unique person I will be (with P = 1), is
> undetermined.
>
>
> so its completely ambiguous
>
>
>
> It is undetermined, but not ambiguous. You know precise things here:
> 1) you know that you will feel to be one precise person, in W or in M.
> 2) you know that any precise prediction will be refuted by a copy, and
> that we have to take into account all copies, as all have the right to be
> considered as having survived, so you know that you cannot know which of W
> and M will be your next experience.
>
> Now, if you want to call that the 1-ambiguity, be my guest, and the step 4
> question will be: do that ambiguity remain unchanged if we introduce delays
> in the reconstitution in Moscow? Changing the vocabulary will change
> nothing in the reasoning and its conclusions.
>
>
>
>
> to say that after duplication "you" will see this but "you" will not see
> that.
>
> > The guy in W will say, "gosh, I am the one in W, why?"
>>
>
> Because he's the W guy. He did not turn into the W guy and then see W,
>
>
> That changes nothing.
>
>
>
> he saw W and then turned into the W guy. And both the W guy and the M guy
> will say I was the H guy.
>
>
>
> Exactly, and that makes the point, once you understand that we were asking
> a prediction on the possible 1-experience.
>
>
>
>
>
>> > the first person does not feel has having duplicated.
>>
>
> There is no "the first person" there is only "a first person".
>
>> >>  and see no reason shoes can't be duplicated just like everything
>> else.
>>
>> > Not a first person experience FROM the view of the first person
>> experience.
>>
>
> FROM  which "first person experience" is Bruno Marchal referring to?
>
>
> Anyone of them. We have to interview all of them, or a good sample of them.
>
>
>
>
>
> > Do you agree with this? That the probability in Helsinki that (you will
>> feel to be in one city) is equal to one?
>>
>
> ^^^
>  WHO THE HELL IS "YOU"?
>
>
> Distracting question which is out topic, as it has been explained ad
> nauseam. You are ust avoiding answering the question.
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal simply can not speak about personal identity unless there
> are lots of personal pronouns to hide behind.
>
>
> You need only to take the content of the diaries into account.
>
> John, you have not answered the question I asked you. Do you agree that in
> Helsinki we have:
>
> Probability("I will feel to be a unique guy in an unique city") = 1
> (assuming comp and all the default assumptions) ?
>
> Don't say "who the hell is "you?", because we don't need to answer that.
> If both copies get a cup of coffee in the cities, and that you are told
> this in Helsinki, comp implies that in Helsinki P("I will drink coffee") =
> 1, or you should no more say that P = 1 with the simple teleportation
> (without duplication) and eventually you have to say "no" to the doctor and
> abandon comp.
> The identity question is *quite* interesting, but 100% irrelevant here.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to