On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
[if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is
empirically likely]
Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is
duplication possible?
It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple
answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet*
that there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a
number" and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently,
emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1
complete part).
Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate
the "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.
1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular
level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the
'particles'.
2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of
the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of
galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the
"right" fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and
this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you
prefer. No collapse!
Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use
in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before
"jumping" into UD* at step 7.
Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it
exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with
all oracles, infinitely often.
Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low
level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital
encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain
and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of many
slight variants, making the theory working through some digital
encodings.
Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be
defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all
universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable.
But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies.
We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p
view in the computations where you survive).
We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person)
are already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true
relations in between possible universal numbers and other
(arithmetical) entities.
If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have
still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum
mind) or not.
The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from
the fact that
1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very
slowly)
2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the
delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).
I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same
question.
Please tell me if above helped. In step 1-6 I imagine a high level,
to simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non
stopping UD run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your
level.
If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum
doctor. Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change
the consequences.
To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be
shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she
would provide evidence against digital mechanism.
Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it
appears more and more unbelievable.
It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine.
Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truth of
comp, I just study the consequences.
Bruno
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and
without thinking to much
on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-
cloning" theorem.
The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without
assuming physics.
I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents
that theorem.
But do not understand your argument.
It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle.
Could you discuss this?
The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far
you go in the UD-Argument.
If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we
need to assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal
formalism/theory, and I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing.
Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the
arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of
computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person
will not see the difference) going through your state, defined by
some substitution level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent
matter", there will be an infinity of computations needed to
describe exactly that matter (the global FPI domain in arithmetic).
This makes a priori the apparent primitive matter non-clonable. The
primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on infinity of
histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the UD to
define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori
duplicable.
So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this
(which *proves* nothing, to be sure).
If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level
(that is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at
the Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum
mechanics will be exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution
level is below the Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a
quantum brain/computer) then things are more complex. As the UD
emulates also all quantum computations, the reversal physics/
arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be the
fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation
of an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this
from the evidences both from introspection, biology and physics. If
our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be
derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical
(and thus variable in the whole of the physical reality).
We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the
UDA before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult
question.
Bruno
Richard
On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:
Hi List
I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line
magazine
Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury
Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the
use of comp by biological system all the time.
Bruno
George Levy
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