Bruno: Please tell me if above helped. Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", or Platonia, " is completely consistent with my thinking
Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would provide evidence against digital mechanism. Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable, perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds. These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them; amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp. On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, > qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis. > [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically > likely] > > Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication > possible? > > > > It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple > answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that > there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a number" and > emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in > arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part). > > Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the > "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with. > > 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level, > with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'. > > 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the > entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, > (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the "right" fields, > or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) > decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse! > > Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in > the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before "jumping" into > UD* at step 7. > > Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it > exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with all > oracles, infinitely often. > > Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level. > Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of > our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving > species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making > the theory working through some digital encodings. > > Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined > by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal > numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable. > > But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We > borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the > computations where you survive). > > We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person) are > already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in > between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities. > > If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have > still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind) > or not. > The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from the > fact that > > 1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very > slowly) > 2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the > delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD). > > > > > I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question. > > > Please tell me if above helped. In step 1-6 I imagine a high level, to > simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non stopping UD > run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your level. > > If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum doctor. > Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change the > consequences. > > To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be > shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable. > If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would > provide evidence against digital mechanism. > > Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it appears > more and more unbelievable. > It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine. > > Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truth of > comp, I just study the consequences. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without >> thinking to much >> on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival. >> >> Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-cloning" >> theorem. >> >> >> The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without assuming >> physics. >> >> >> >> >> I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that >> theorem. >> But do not understand your argument. >> It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle. >> Could you discuss this? >> >> >> The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you go >> in the UD-Argument. >> If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need to >> assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/theory, and >> I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing. >> >> Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the >> arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of >> computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person will not >> see the difference) going through your state, defined by some substitution >> level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent matter", there will be an >> infinity of computations needed to describe exactly that matter (the global >> FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive >> matter non-clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on >> infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the >> UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori >> duplicable. >> >> So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively, >> consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves* >> nothing, to be sure). >> >> If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level >> (that is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at the >> Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum mechanics will be >> exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution level is below the >> Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a quantum brain/computer) then >> things are more complex. As the UD emulates also all quantum computations, >> the reversal physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be >> the fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of >> an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the >> evidences both from introspection, biology and physics. If our subst level >> is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from >> arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in >> the whole of the physical reality). >> >> We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA >> before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote: >>> >>> Hi List >>> >>> I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might >>> be interested in this article from the Science >>> Daily<http://www.sciencedaily.com/>on line magazine >>> >>> Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain >>> Injury<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm> >>> >>> >>> Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best, >>> Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat. Even >>> if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the human will >>> say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to much on the >>> theoretical consequences of the possible survival. >>> >>> To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal long >>> ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the use of comp >>> by biological system all the time. >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> George Levy >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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