Bruno: Please tell me if above helped.

Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures, if you
want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", or Platonia, "  is
completely consistent with my thinking

Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should
be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would
provide evidence against digital mechanism.

Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable,
perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime
sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds.

These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp
if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them;
amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp.


On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
> qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
> [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically
> likely]
>
> Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication
> possible?
>
>
>
> It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple
> answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that
> there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a number" and
> emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in
> arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part).
>
> Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the
> "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.
>
> 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level,
> with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'.
>
> 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the
> entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies,
> (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the "right" fields,
> or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10)
> decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse!
>
> Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in
> the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before "jumping" into
> UD* at step 7.
>
> Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it
> exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with all
> oracles, infinitely often.
>
> Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level.
> Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of
> our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving
> species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making
> the theory working through some digital encodings.
>
> Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined
> by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal
> numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable.
>
> But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We
> borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the
> computations where you survive).
>
> We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person) are
> already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in
> between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities.
>
> If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have
> still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind)
> or not.
> The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from the
> fact that
>
> 1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very
> slowly)
> 2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the
> delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).
>
>
>
>
> I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question.
>
>
> Please tell me if above helped.  In step 1-6 I imagine a high level, to
> simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non stopping UD
> run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your level.
>
> If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum doctor.
> Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change the
> consequences.
>
> To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be
> shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
> If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would
> provide evidence against digital mechanism.
>
> Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it appears
> more and more unbelievable.
> It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine.
>
> Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truth of
> comp, I just study the consequences.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without
>> thinking to much
>> on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
>>
>> Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-cloning"
>> theorem.
>>
>>
>> The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without assuming
>> physics.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that
>> theorem.
>> But do not understand your argument.
>> It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle.
>> Could you discuss this?
>>
>>
>> The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you go
>> in the UD-Argument.
>> If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need to
>> assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/theory, and
>> I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing.
>>
>> Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the
>> arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of
>> computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person will not
>> see the difference) going through your state, defined by some substitution
>> level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent matter", there will be an
>> infinity of computations needed to describe exactly that matter (the global
>> FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive
>> matter non-clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on
>> infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the
>> UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori
>> duplicable.
>>
>> So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively,
>> consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves*
>> nothing, to be sure).
>>
>> If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level
>> (that is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at the
>> Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum mechanics will be
>> exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution level is below the
>> Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a quantum brain/computer) then
>> things are more complex. As the UD emulates also all quantum computations,
>> the reversal physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be
>> the fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of
>> an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the
>> evidences both from introspection, biology  and physics. If our subst level
>> is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from
>> arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in
>> the whole of the physical reality).
>>
>> We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA
>> before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:
>>>
>>>  Hi List
>>>
>>> I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might
>>> be interested in this article from the Science 
>>> Daily<http://www.sciencedaily.com/>on line magazine
>>>
>>> Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain 
>>> Injury<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/12/131209152259.htm>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
>>> Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat. Even
>>> if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the human will
>>> say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to much on the
>>> theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
>>>
>>> To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal long
>>> ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the use of comp
>>> by biological system all the time.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> George Levy
>>>
>>>
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>>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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>>>
>>>
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